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–SYMPOSIUM–

THE OUTCOMES, ECONOMICS AND ETHICS
OF THE WORKPLACE WELLNESS INDUSTRY
Al Lewis †††
Abstract
On its surface, who can argue with the concept of workplace wellness?
How could there be anything wrong with corporations helping their
employees reduce their risk of disease while saving money in the process?
What turns out to be wrong with the implied answer to this rhetorical
question, as this essay will show, is that it is completely incorrect. Wellness
programs have conferred no measurable benefit on the American
workforce. 1 Further, vendors routinely disregard clinical guidelines that are
designed to avoid overtreatment, inappropriate doctor visits, and
increasingly ubiquitous crash-dieting contests.
The economics follow the harms. Essentially every dollar companies
spend on vendor-administered workplace-wellness programs is lost. 2 As a
result, much of the wellness-vendor community has resorted to making
demonstrably false claims about savings in order to maintain its revenue
stream. 3
These results—or lack thereof—might be acceptable if employees liked
wellness programs. Certainly, employers spend money on programs
without quantifiable benefits specifically because employees like them,
such as holiday parties and field days. Wellness programs, however, are not

†

Al Lewis is CEO of Quizzify LLC (www.quizzify.com), the leading employee health
literacy vendor. He is author of Why Nobody Believes the Numbers (Wiley, 2012),
Cracking Health Costs (with Tom Emerick, Wiley, 2013) and Surviving Workplace
Wellness (with Vik Khanna, The Health Care Blog, 2014). He holds JD (‘82) and BA
phi beta kappa (‘78) from Harvard, where he also taught economics.
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Each company named in this article has been given multiple chances to rebut,
clarify or retract, publicly or privately. All except Wellsteps declined. (Wellsteps’
rebuttal is in the article.) In particular, the relevant employees of WatsonHealth
(IBM), United Healthcare, McKesson, British Petroleum, and the Boise School
District declined to respond to direct email requests to offer their viewpoints on
the materials specific to their organizations.

1.

Al Lewis, Part 3 of the Proof Wellness Doesn’t Work, THEY SAID WHAT? (Nov. 5,
2015),
https://theysaidwhat.net/2015/11/05/part-3-of-the-proof-wellnessdoesnt-work/ (showing that there has been no reduction in hospital admissions
and no net reduction in employer-paid costs for diseases or events associated with
poor cardiometabolic health, such as heart attacks and diabetes-related events).

2.

Id.

3.

See ZOE CONSULTING, INC., infra note 197.
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programs that employees like. 4 Quite the contrary, to convince employees
to participate in wellness programs, employers must threaten them with
financial forfeitures, such as fines, foregone incentives, or even losing their
health benefits, for refusing to submit to wellness programs. 5 These
forfeitures are a major source of what sponsoring organizations assert are
savings. 6
Wellness is the only segment of the three-trillion-dollar healthcare
industry, other than childhood vaccinations, in which patients are
effectively required to access healthcare services whether or not they want
to do so. Employers are allowed to withhold or reclaim large sums of money
from employees who refuse to submit to healthcare services, creating a
moral hazard in which the programs that are most unappealing to
employees are the most profitable for employers. It is also the only segment
of the healthcare industry without oversight that mandates provider
licensure, education, training, certification, or continuing education. 7
Further, wellness programs are not required to comply with clinical
guidelines. 8
Guidelines for wellness programs do exist, though. The United States
Preventive Services Task Force (“USPSTF”), a panel of experts on preventive
and evidence-based medicine, provides health-related recommendations
based on peer-reviewed studies and issues guidelines for how to
appropriately provide medical care to patients. 9 The wellness industry
should be subject to regulations that require vendors to disclose to
employers if any components of their programs do not comply with the
guidelines that the USPSTF promulgates, and to give employees the choice
to opt out of non-compliant components without subjecting them to
forfeitures. Otherwise, employees may not realize that these programs
have the potential to be harmful. Requiring vendors to disclose to
employers their non-adherence to clinical guidelines would help address
4.

See Natasha Singer, Health Plan Penalty Ends at Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/business/after-uproar-penn-statesuspends-penalty-fee-in-wellness-plan.html.

5.

EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854 (2015).

6.

See, e.g., Rahul K. Parikh, Do Workplace Wellness Programs Work?, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/15/opinion/la-oe-parikhemployee-wellness-programs-20130912 (providing an example of a vendor that
proposes this source of savings); Al Lewis, Bravo Wellness Offers “Savings” by
SAID
WHAT?
(Jan.
9,
2015),
Fining
Employees,
THEY
https://theysaidwhat.net/2015/02/09/bravo-wellness-offers-savings-by-finingemployees/.

7.

See
Wellness
&
Health
Promotion
Certification,
NCQA,
http://www.ncqa.org/programs/certification/whp-certification (last visited Apr.
1, 2017) (offering a non-governmental wellness promotion certification).

8.

Id.

9.

About the USPSTF, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE (Oct. 2016),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/about-the-uspstf.
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the industry’s innumeracy, ethical lapses, and data falsification, as such
disclosures would make employers more likely to question the vendors’
highly controversial claims that their programs lead to health improvement
and savings. 10 Absent regulations, a simple civil remedy could arise from
vendors’ failure to adhere to voluntary, minimal standards enumerated in
the Employee Health and Wellness Program Code of Conduct. 11
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I.

Introduction

Workplace wellness can be divided into two distinct components for
the purposes of this article—wellness done for employees and wellness
done to employees. Wellness done for employees includes perks: better or
locally sourced food in the cafeteria, subsidized gym memberships,
unlimited vacation days, free physician house calls, and on-site clinics or
10.

See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Top Wellness Award Goes to Workplace Where Many
(Sept.
27,
2016),
Health
Measures
Got
Worse,
STATNEWS
https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/27/workplace-wellness-award/.

11.

See The Employee Health and Wellness Program Code of Conduct, ETHICAL WELLNESS,
www.ethicalwellness.org (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Code of Conduct].
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spas. 12 These perks are often a significant part of employers’ recruiting
efforts. 13 Wellness done for employees does not include initiatives that
require annual medical tests, fines, or penalties. Because wellness done for
employees is voluntary, it creates no significant medico-legal or regulatory
concerns. Wellness done for employees is not the subject of this article.
Instead, the subject of this essay is the second, distinctly different,
component: wellness done to employees. This type of wellness is not a perk,
because employees forfeit an average of $670 per year for refusing to
submit to their employers’ programs’ requirements. 14
A.

Health Risk Assessments

One component of wellness done to employees is the health risk
assessment (“HRA”). Half of employers with two hundred or more workers
require that their employees complete an HRA. 15 HRAs ask questions about
an employee’s diet, lifestyle, drinking habits, and drug use and typically
assess an employee’s risk for future health problems. 16 HRAs ask invasive
questions, forcing employees to disclose private health information. 17 They
also often provide incorrect, unclear, or inappropriate information to
employees. Cerner, a wellness provider, produces an HRA that illustrates
the problems surrounding HRA use. 18 Its HRA suggests, for example, that an
employee with a pulse pressure of 20 mmHg “talk to [his] healthcare
provider to discuss ways to reduce this risk.” 19 Realistically, however, this
employee would exist only in intensive care, because a pulse pressure of 20
mmHg signals a serious cardiovascular event. 20 The author tested Cerner’s
HRA using a hypothetical light drinker who reports taking Ambien nightly;
12.

Abigail Thorpe, The 44 Healthiest Companies to Work for in America, GREATIST (Oct.
27, 2015), http://greatist.com/health/healthiest-companies.

13.

See, e.g., The Daily Muse Editor, Healthy at Work: 7 Corporate Wellness Perks We
Love, THE MUSE, https://www.themuse.com/advice/healthy-at-work-7-corporatewellness-perks-we-love (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).

14.

Ed Emerman, Companies Are Spending More on Corporate Wellness Programs but
Employees Are Leaving Millions on the Table, NAT’L BUS. GROUP ON HEALTH (Mar. 26,
2015),
https://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressroom/pressRelease.cfm?ID=252.

15.

KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2015 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 196 (2015).

16.

Id. at 196-97.

17.

See Singer, supra note 4.

18.

See, e.g., Workforce Health: Population health management for a healthy, happy
and productive workplace, CERNER, https://www.cerner.com/solutions/employer
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).

19.

Screenshot capturing this advice was on their brochure, which was discontinued
following the observation that this advice was wrong. A screenshot of the original
is available from the author.

20.

Tansel Yildiran et al., Low Pulse Pressure as a Predictor of Death, 37 TEXAS HEART
INST. J. 284, 284 (2010) (nothing that a pulse pressure of less than 30-mmHg was a
high predictor of death).
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the results are shown in Figure 1. The HRA assessed his risk for chronic
health issues as both “moderate” and “high.” 21 Using both terms creates
confusion. The HRA results do not clarify how a “wellness score” differs
from a score assessing “risk for chronic health issues.” It also fails to explain
why regular, well-tolerated, prescribed use of a standard dose of Ambien
creates “HIGH risk for chronic health issues,” especially absent any other
high-risk factors, since there is no clear or even suggested causal link
between Ambien use and chronic health problems. 22

Figure 1. The results from Cerner’s risk assessment of a light drinker who takes Ambien
nightly. It asserts that such a person’s risk is both “HIGH” and “Moderate.”

Finally, the Cerner HRA advises employees to reduce their consumption
of both dietary cholesterol and saturated fat, 23 advice that the Office of
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion’s dietary guidelines directly
contradict. 24 Though whether saturated fat poses a health risk is
controversial, 25 Cerner’s HRA presents its recommendation as though it is
undisputedly true that people should reduce the amount of saturated fat in
their diets. Further, advising people to consume less fat causes them to

21.

See
Wellness
Management,
http://www.cerner.com/solutions/employers/wellness_management/
taken from author’s own results; results on file with Author).

22.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (AMBIEN) (1992),
available
at
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2017/019908s038lbl.pd
f.

23.

HRA screenshot recommending this diet is available upon request to author.

24.

Jen Christensen, New Dietary Guidelines Limit Sugar, Rethink Cholesterol, CNN
(Jan. 7, 2016, 4:46 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/07/health/2015-dietaryguidelines/; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. & U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE, 2015-2020
DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS (8th ed. 2015).

25.

See, Kathleen Doheny, Saturated Fats Not So Bad? Not So Fast, Critics of New
Analysis Say, WEBMD (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.webmd.com/heartdisease/news/20140320/dietary-fats-q-a; NINA TEICHOLZ, THE BIG FAT SURPRISE: WHY
BUTTER, CHEESE AND MEAT BELONG IN A HEALTHY DIET (2014).
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substitute foods high in sugar, which increases the risk of diabetes. 26 As a
result, Cerner’s advice may actually increase risk, rather than reducing it.
HRAs also omit advice that they should include. For example, virtually
no HRA advises a sixty-year-old employee with a history of chicken pox to
discuss a shingles vaccine with a doctor. 27 Also, while HRAs place major
emphasis on buckling seatbelts, virtually no HRA cautions against texting
while driving. 28 In both situations, the hazard is real and avoidable, but the
risk of the latter, though well-established, is not well-understood in the
employee population.
B.

Biometric Screening

Another component of wellness done to employees is biometric
screening. In some cases, to avoid a forfeiture, employees must attend a
health fair at which their blood is drawn and they are given a lab report
showing whether their cholesterol, glucose, or another blood value is out
of the expected range. 29 Roughly half of employers with more than two
hundred employees require employees to participate in these health fairs
or screenings to avoid forfeiture. 30 Biometric screenings are not inherently
problematic, and in fact would likely be beneficial if done according to the
USPSTF’s specifications. The USPSTF provides screening guidelines that are
designed to balance the benefits of early detection with the potential
harmful effects of false positives. 31 These guidelines state that the “optimal
interval for screening is uncertain” for males over thirty-five and females
over forty-five. Historically, the USPSTF guidelines recommended blood
screenings every five years for people who are not at risk for heart disease
or diabetes, and at more frequent intervals for people who are at risk for
heart disease or diabetes (“at risk”). 32 For younger employees, the
26.

See Kris Gunnars, 7 Ways the Low-Fat Diet Can Harm Your Health, AUTHORITY
NUTRITION, https://authoritynutrition.com/7-ways-the-low-fat-diet-destroys-yourhealth/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (listing ways in which reducing fat can adversely
impact health).

27.

The author, who has reviewed more than 50 HRAs, is unaware of any HRA advising
a 60-year-old who had chicken pox to discuss a shingles vaccine with a doctor.

28.

The author, who has reviewed more than 50 HRAs, is unaware of any HRA advising
not to text while driving.

29.

L.V. Anderson, Workplace Wellness Programs are a Sham, SLATE (Sept. 2, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/the_ladder/2016/09/workpl
ace_wellness_programs_are_a_sham.html.

30.

KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 15, at 198.

31.

See Published Recommendations, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE (Apr. 2017),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/BrowseRec/Index/browserecommendations.

32.

See Lipid Disorders in Adults (Cholesterol, Dyslipidemia): Screening, U.S. PREVENTIVE
SERVS. TASK FORCE (Dec. 2014) [hereinafter Lipid Disorders in Adults],
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Document/Recommendat
ionStatementFinal/lipid-disorders-in-adults-cholesterol-dyslipidemia-screening.
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guidelines have historically recommended blood screenings only for those
who are at risk. 33 Many health-maintenance organizations recommend
screening every four to six years or recommend screening intervals that
depend on a person’s risk for disease.34 Vendors, however, routinely flout
these guidelines and ignore risk and age considerations. Instead, they
screen everyone annually. 35 Some vendors also screen for markers for
which the USPSTF recommends against screening for, due to the potential
harms arising from false positives. 36 Additionally, many wellness programs
require an annual checkup, 37 though research overwhelmingly concludes
that annual checkups are more likely to harm than benefit employees. 38
C.

Weight-loss contests

Finally, there is the crash-dieting component. This component of
wellness programs takes the form of biggest-loser contests or weight-loss
challenges and involves weigh-ins over a short period of time. 39 Putting
money at stake can encourage very unhealthy forms of cheating to ensure
33.

USPSTF A and B Recommendations, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERV. TASK FORCE (June 2016),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/uspstf-a-and-brecommendations/ (listing optimal screening guidelines); see also Health
Checkups: When you need them—and when you don’t, CHOOSING WISELY,
http://www.choosingwisely.org/patient-resources/health-checkups/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017) (providing a lay version of USPSTF screening guidelines).

34.

When to Have a Cholesterol Test – Topic Overview, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/cholesterol-management/tc/when-to-have-acholesterol-test-topic-overview (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).

35.

Bryce Williams, The Big Wellness Question: To Test or not to Test, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.benefitnews.com/opinion/wellness-wars-screeningfor-risk-vs-over-testing.

36.

Al Lewis, Total Wellness Presents the Best Argument for Regulating the Wellness
SAID
WHAT?
(Oct.
18,
2015),
Industry,
THEY
https://theysaidwhat.net/2015/10/18/total-wellness-presents-the-bestargument-for-wellness-industry-regulation/.

37.

See, e.g., Wellness Program, NEW ORLEANS (Oct. 3, 2016, 1:39 PM),
http://www.nola.gov/health-plan/wellness-program/; STATE HEALTH BENEFITS
PROGRAM RETIREE WELLNESS PROGRAM ANNUAL PHYSICIAN CERTIFICATION, HORIZON BLUE CROSS
BLUE
SHIELD
OF
NEW
JERSEY,
available
at
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/pdf/hb/horizon-wellness-cert.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).

38.

Nadia Kounang, Do Annual Checkups Do More Harm than Good?, CNN (Oct. 15,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/16/health/annual-physical-unnecessary/;
Lasse T. Krogsbøll et al., General Health Checks in Adults for Reducing Morbidity
and Mortality From Disease, 23 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 2489 (2013).

39.

See, e.g., Katerina, Corporate weight loss challenge, MY DIET & WEGHT [sic] LOSS
(May 18, 2015), http://mydiet-weightloss.blogspot.com/2015/05/corporateweight-loss-challenge.html; Al Lewis, Wellness Corporate Solutions Gives Us a
Dose of Much-Needed Criticism, THEY SAID WHAT? (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://theysaidwhat.net/2015/02/13/wellness-corporate-solutions-gives-us-adose-of-much-needed-criticism/.
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success in the short run, 40 while new research confirms the harms of
repeated weight-cycling, or “yo-yo dieting,” in the long run. 41

II.

The History of Wellness

Workplace wellness programs have existed for several decades. 42 As a
result, most of the studies cited in recent literature that show favorable
outcomes from workplace wellness programs are outdated. 43 Wellness
programs became much more prominent when Congress passed the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), which contains a
wellness provision informally known as the Safeway Amendment that
permits employers to make thirty percent of non-smokers’ total healthcare
premiums—and fifty percent of smokers’ premiums—contingent on their
adopting healthy behaviors or on outcomes such as weight loss and
smoking cessation. 44 Under the Safeway Amendment, non-adherent
employees pay a much higher percentage of their premiums, while
employers, ironically, save money on insurance in direct proportion to the
number of employees either refusing to participate or, in the case of
outcomes-based programs, who are unable to lose weight or stop smoking.
There is no formal legislative history that describes deliberations about
the Safeway Amendment or documents introduced in support of or in
opposition to it because Congress did not debate it. 45 There are two main
economic explanations that the Safeway Amendments’ supporters use to
justify the ACA’s support for workplace-wellness.

40.

See Biggest Loser Competition? Here’s how to WIN!!, HEALTH STATUS,
https://www.healthstatus.com/health_blog/body-fat-calculator-2/biggest-losercompetition-win/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017); see, e.g., Al Lewis, Schlumberger’s
program confirms that in wellness, harming employees is the new black, THEY SAID
WHAT? (Jan. 23, 2017), https://theysaidwhat.net/2017/01/23/schlumbergersprogram-confirms-that-in-wellness-harming-employees-is-the-new-black/
(noting that Schlumberger and other energy companies charge as much as
$10,000 for a team of five).

41.

See Honor Whiteman, Yo-yo dieting may raise death risk for people with heart
NEWS
TODAY
(Apr.
6,
2017),
disease,
MED.
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/316778.php.

42.

Michael Rucker, The Interesting History of Workplace Wellness,
MICHAELRUCKER.COM (May 20, 2016), http://michaelrucker.com/workplacewellness/the-history-of-workplace-wellness/.

43.

See, e.g., Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 29
HEALTH AFF. 304, 311 (citing several studies that may be out of date).

44.

Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78
Fed. Reg. 33159 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146 and 147).

45.

See generally John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How
Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 L. LIBRARY J. 131 (2013).
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A.

Congress’s Justification: Safeway’s Wellness Program

Safeway’s allegation that it reduced spending on healthcare by forty
percent through its wellness program is the first justification for the ACA’s
wellness provision. 46 Safeway’s corporate wellness program was so
prominent and unique that the ACA’s wellness provision is referred to as
the Safeway Amendment. 47 No one appears to have challenged Safeway’s
reduced-spending claim in the media, even after the Washington Post
revealed, two months prior to the ACA vote, that Safeway did not actually
have a wellness program in place during the period in which this alleged
reduction in corporate healthcare spending occurred. 48 It would be
impossible to attribute the forty-percent decline in Safeway’s healthcare
spending to a program that did not exist.
B.

Post-hoc Justification: The “Harvard Study”

The second justification for the ACA’s support for wellness programs
was a meta-analysis that three Harvard researchers completed (“Harvard
Study”).” 49 The Harvard Study claims to have found that wellness programs
result in a 3.27-to-1 return-on-investment (“ROI”) from reduced healthcare
spending. 50 This study suffers from a number of problems, including an
author’s conflict of interest and underlying issues with the studies on which
it relies. Despite its many problems, this study has become a touchstone for
almost all wellness-vendor websites and has been cited over six hundred
times in formal academic literature alone. 51 In contrast, a subsequent
Health Affairs study that showed that wellness programs do not result in
savings received only fourteen citations and no mentions on any vendor
website. 52
David Cutler, a Harvard professor and a co-author of the Harvard Study,
was a healthcare adviser to President Obama during the push for the ACA’s

46.

Stephen A. Burd, How Safeway Is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J. (June 12,
2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124476804026308603.

47.

Chelsea Reynolds, Myths Surround Reform’s ‘Safeway Amendment’, ASS’N OF
HEALTHCARE
JOURNALISTS
(Jan.
20,
2010),
http://healthjournalism.org/blog/2010/01/myth-surrounds-reforms-safewayamendment/.

48.

David Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims about Safeway Wellness Incentives Shape
Health Care Bill, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011503319.html.

49.

Baicker et al., supra note 43, at 308-09.

50.

Id. at 309.

51.

See Id.

52.

See Gautam Gowrisankaran et al., A Hospital System’s Wellness Program Linked
to Health Plan Enrollment Cut Hospitalizations but Not Overall Costs, 32 HEALTH
AFF. 477 (2013) (finding that participation in a wellness program decreased
hospitalizations but did not save employers).
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passage. 53 After Cutler expressed support for the ACA as President Obama’s
adviser and after disclosing only his Harvard affiliation, he co-authored the
Harvard Study, which provides economic support for the wellness provision
of the ACA. 54 In the years following the Harvard Study’s publication, both
lead authors have consistently claimed that they are uninterested in the
wellness industry and none of the authors has ever defended the study’s
findings. 55
Katherine Baicker, the study’s other lead author, stated that readers
should pay more attention to the study’s limitations, 56 and has wavered on
the study’s conclusion several times. 57 For example, initially, she calculated
savings attributed to wellness programs’ successes to two significant digits,
conveying certainty in the study’s findings. 58 After publication, however,
she stated that it was “too early to tell” whether wellness programs work
and that employers need to “experiment” on their employees. 59 Later, she
again qualified the Harvard Study’s conclusion when she provided
additional reasons why the study should not be taken at face value: 60
1. the study cannot be generalized, especially to smaller employers,
since the component studies were all based on very large employers;
2. only companies that believed that these programs would be
successful would undertake them, creating self-selection bias; and

53.

Biography: David M. Cutler, HARV. UNIV., https://scholar.harvard.edu/cutler/biocv
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).

54.

Id.

55.

Paul Carroll, Editor’s Note: A Step in the Evolution of ITL, INS. THOUGHT LEADERSHIP
(Mar. 3, 2014), http://insurancethoughtleadership.com/editorsnotes/a-step-inthe-evolution-of-itl-2/#axzz2yawgiWgx.

56.

Frank Diamond, Wellness Debate Irrelevant for Insurers Eyeing the Market,
CARE
(Feb.
2014),
MANAGED
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2014/2/wellness-debateirrelevant-insurers-eyeing-market.

57.

Shannon Mullen, Can Your Boss Fine You for Not Disclosing Your Weight?,
MARKETPLACE (July 22, 2013), http://www.marketplace.org/2013/07/22/healthcare/can-your-boss-fine-you-not-disclosing-your-weight/; Diamond, supra note
56; Julie Rovner, Wellness at Work Often Comes with Strings Attached, NPR (Dec.
11,
2014),
http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2014/12/09/369352885/wellness-at-work-often-comes-with-stringsattached.

58.

Baicker et al., supra note 43, at 304 (calculating a 3.27-to-1 ROI; the two digits to
the right of the decimal point are called “significant digits,” which signifies the
author’s conclusion of accuracy to somewhere between 3.265-to-1 and 3.275-to1).

59.

Mullen, supra note 57.

60.

Diamond, supra note 56.
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3. only companies that believed that these programs worked for
them would allow their results to be published, creating publication
bias.

Baicker also admitted that “there are few studies with reliable data on
both the costs and the benefits” of wellness. 61 She did not name any of the
“few studies with reliable data,” and the actual studies comprising this
meta-analysis are mostly obsolete; the underlying studies were published
during the twentieth century, an era in which preventable heart attacks
were far more common than they are now. 62 Almost all were authored or
co-authored by wellness vendors or consultants. 63 None were published in
journals that had ever previously published articles critical of wellness. 64 It
is therefore possible that wellness vendors’ and consultants’ involvement
in the underlying studies created investigator bias or publication bias,
potentially affecting the studies’ validity. Most importantly, at least four
component studies 65 reached conclusions that could not pass peer review
today because they are not supported—and are even arguably
invalidated—by the evidence they present. 66
The first study shows that people who were previously at high risk for
chronic disease declined in risk more than low-risk people between the first
measurement of risk and the follow-up measurement. 67 It shows, for
61.

Rovner, supra note 57.

62.

See Baicker et al., supra note 43, at Appendix, Table 1; Healthcare Cost and
Utilization Project, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Feb. 2017) [hereinafter HCUP],
http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp?Id=45755C20A787AFBF&Form=DispTab&J
S=Y&Action=%3E%3ENext%3E%3E&__InDispTab=Yes&_Results=Print&SortOpt=
(noting that the number of heart attacks (diagnosis code: ICD-9 410) in the
privately insured working age population has fallen from 226,000 in 1997 (the first
year for which statistics are available) to 153,000 in 2013 (the last year for which
statistics are available)).

63.

See, e.g., Baicker et al., supra note 43, at Appendix (showing the first study in the
appendix was co-authored by Ron Goetzel, the second was authored by Steve
Aldana, CEO of Wellsteps (see infra note 164), the third was authored by Ron
Ozminkowski, a senior executive in United Healthcare’s wellness subsidiary).

64.

A 10-year scan of database abstracts in Journal of Occupational and Environmental
Medicine and American Journal of Health Promotion revealed only two, one of
which appears to have been accidental. Siyan Baxter et al., The Relationship
between Return on Investment and Quality of Study Methodology in Workplace
Health Promotion Programs, 28 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOT. 347 (July 2014) (showing a
negative ROI from high-quality studies). But see Michael P. O’Donnell, What is the
ROI for Workplace Health Promotion? It Really Does Depend, and That’s the Point,
29 AM. J. HEALTH PROM. V (2015) (explaining that Baxter et al.’s conclusion was not
intended).

65.

These four studies were examined because they did not require payment for
access; the other twenty-four required payment for access.

66.

See generally, supra notes 52-58.

67.

Leiyu Shi, Health Promotion, Medical Care Use, and Costs in a Sample of Worksite
Employees, 17 EVALUATION REV. 475 (1993).
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example, that people with a lot of weight to lose lost more weight than
people who had less weight or no weight to lose. People with high
cholesterol were more likely to show declines in their cholesterol levels
than people without high cholesterol. 68 The study attributed this decline in
risk to the screening-and-coaching intervention, an intervention through
which screeners hunt for risk factors and then refer employees with risk
factors to coaches to help them reduce the risk factors. 69 The problem,
however, with attributing the greater decline in risk factors among high-risk
people to the intervention is that low-risk people cannot reduce risk, but
high-risk people can. Smokers can stop smoking, but non-smokers cannot.
Overweight people can lose weight, but thin people cannot or should not.
The relatively greater decline in risk in a high-risk population when
compared to against a low-risk population is called the natural flow of risk
and would not be attributable to a wellness program. 70
The second study, published in 1998, put participants who were at risk
for heart disease on a low-fat diet, which, at the time, was incorrectly
considered a heart-healthy diet. 71 There was no meaningful risk
reduction. 72 The study’s authors claimed that the program produced
immediate, substantial savings, though their dietary advice was flawed and
despite a documented lack of meaningful reduction in risk. 73
The third study claimed savings that could not be attributable to the
program—made up of an HRA and annual cholesterol screenings—it
studied. The savings could not be attributed to HRAs or annual cholesterol
screenings because HRAs and cholesterol screenings do not affect the
categories of disease in which savings were claimed. 74 The study claimed
HRAs and annual cholesterol screenings had led to improvements in
“diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs,” including sideropenic
dysphagia, lymphangioma, von Willebrand Disease, and cat-scratch fever. 75
Answering questions and reducing cholesterol would not prevent any of
those diseases.
68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

DEE W. EDINGTON, UNIV. MICH. HEALTH MGMT. RESEARCH CTR., LOST PRODUCTIVITY: THE HIGH
COST
OF
DOING
NOTHING
(2006),
available
at
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:DGUr02kp1p0J:www.
umich.edu/~hmrc/research/pdf/printableresearchslides.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=c
lnk&gl=us.

71.

See generally James F. Fries & Dennis McShane, Reducing Need and Demand for
Medical Services in High-risk Persons: A Health Education Approach, 169 WEST J.
MED. 201 (1998).

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Shirley A. Musich et al., Effectiveness of health promotion programs in moderating
medical costs in the USA, 15 HEALTH PROMOT. INT’L 5 (2000).

75.

Id.
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The fourth study showed twenty-nine percent savings for participants
when compared to non-participants. 76 Several natural experiments show
that the participant-versus-non-participant study design is invalid. 77
Further, it is not possible to save twenty-nine percent on healthcare
spending through wellness because wellness-sensitive medical admissions
(“WSMAs”) represent only about two percent of total spending. 78
Additionally, the Harvard Study has not been replicated. The single
attempt to confirm the Harvard Study’s findings, a study that the wellness
trade journal conducted, concluded that randomized control trials (“RCTs”)
studying wellness programs show negative returns on investment, directly
contradicting the Harvard Study’s conclusion. 79

III.

The Politics of Wellness

For several years after the ACA passed, it was difficult to determine who
benefited from the provision allowing employers to tie employees’ health
behavior and health outcomes to their healthcare premiums, especially
since the economics of wellness do not support forcing non-compliant
employees to pay substantially more for health insurance. Few, if any, of
the twenty-five types of hospital admissions on which employers spend the
most in aggregate could be avoided through the methods wellness
programs promote, including HRAs, biometric screenings, additional
checkups, or crash-dieting contests. 80
Even including diseases that are not diagnosed through mass
screenings, such as heart failure and asthma, only seven to eight percent of
all admissions are theoretically avoidable through a wellness or diseasemanagement program. 81 Simple math suggests that only a small percentage
76.

Ron Z. Goetzel et al., Health Care Costs of Worksite Health Promotion Participants
and Non-Participants,

40 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 341 (1998).
77.

Al Lewis, Do Wellness Outcomes Reports Systematically and Dramatically
Overstate Savings?, AJMC.COM (Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Wellness Outcomes],
http://www.ajmc.com/contributor/al-lewis-jd/2017/01/do-wellness-outcomesreports-systematically-and-dramatically-overstate-savings.

78.

Goetzel et al., supra note 76.

79.

Baxter et al., supra note 64.

80.

HCUP, supra note 62; see also Al Lewis, Chronic Disease in the Workplace: Are We
(Feb.
16,
2016),
Fighting
the
Wrong
Battle?,
AMJC.COM
http://www.ajmc.com/contributor/al-lewis-jd/2016/02/chronic-disease-in-theworkplace-are-we-fighting-the-wrong-battle (providing a table derived from the
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project listing these top 25 types of hospital
admissions for the employer-insured population).

81.

This percentage is derived from the number of admissions for the diagnosis codes
in Fries & McShane, supra note 71, divided by the total number of admissions for
the privately insured population, for 2013 (last full year available). The data source
is available from HCUP, supra note 62. See also HEALTH ENHANCEMENT RESEARCH ORG.
& POPULATION HEALTH ALLIANCE, PROGRAM MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION GUIDE: CORE

13

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
The Outcomes, Economics and Ethics of the Workplace Wellness Industry

of that seven percent could be avoided if wellness actually worked,
especially given employees’ low rate of participation in wellness
programs. 82 Wellness proponent and industry leader Ron Goetzel, who
directs Watson Health’s wellness-consulting arm, has acknowledged that
only one to two percent of risk, and therefore only one to two percent of
that seven to eight percent of admissions and emergency-room visits, can
be avoided after two to three years. 83 The cost of avoiding that small
percentage, as will be shown below, would overwhelm any savings from the
avoided healthcare spending.
By process of elimination, the only economic justification remaining for
wellness is the money that the Safeway Amendment permits employers to
withhold. It essentially allows employers to take money from employees
who refuse to submit to wellness or cannot lose sufficient weight in the
form of forfeitures. Employees from lower socioeconomic strata are
disproportionately the victims of this forfeiture. 84
Because it takes two to three years for behavior changes to translate
into risk reduction, even according to Goetzel, penalties are the only way to
generate immediate cost savings. 85 This fact is not well-publicized. Bravo
Wellness, the only vendor that has ever advertised penalties as source of
savings on their website, removed the reference from their website
following exposure of this reference by the author. 86
The political force behind the Safeway Amendment and the transfer of
wealth from employees to employers via forfeitures was unclear for several
years. But starting in 2013, the Business Roundtable (“BRT”), a public-policy
group made up of high-level executives from major American
corporations, 87 began to publicly support wellness programs. 88 In 2013, the
METRICS FOR EMPLOYEE HEALTH MANAGEMENT 22-23 (2015) (concurring that only seven
to eight percent of all admissions are theoretically avoidable through a wellness
or disease-management program).
82.

See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND CORP., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL
REPORT 8 (2013) (Reporting that “fewer than half” of employees complete the
screening and HRAs, and of those completers invited into a wellness program,
roughly 20% participate.).

83.

Mark Taylor, Do Workplace Wellness Programs Work?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 19,
2016, 8:41 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/sc-wellnessprograms-health-0720-20160718-story.html.

84.

Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in The Workplace: Cost Savings Through
Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFF. 468 (2013).

85.

Taylor, supra note 83.

86.

See The Bravo Difference, BRAVO WELLNESS (accessed July 10, 2016) (on file with
author).

87.

ROUND
More
Than
Leaders:
Leadership,
BUSINESS
http://businessroundtable.org/about (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).

88.

See GARY LOVEMAN, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON PENDING WELLNESS
RULE (May 2, 2013); See Sharon Begley, US CEOs Threaten to Pull Tacit Obamacare
Support
over
“Wellness”
Spat,
REUTERS
(Nov.
29,
2014),
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BRT lobbied for more corporate discretion over the rules governing the
forfeitures and less oversight from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). 89 In 2014, the BRT lobbied President Obama directly,
threatening to withdraw its support for the ACA if it constrained corporate
control over forfeitures. 90 In 2015, the BRT threatened to push for an Act of
Congress to enshrine the ACA’s wellness provisions if the EEOC continued
to represent employees against wellness-program overreach. 91 The BRT
also prevailed upon the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Committee to hold a hearing about wellness programs called “Employer
Wellness Programs: Better Health Outcomes and Lower Costs.” 92 As the
hearing title implies, the Senate did not invite skeptics of wellness
programs’ outcomes and savings claims to testify at this hearing. 93
The BRT’s counterparts at the United States Chamber of Commerce are
also major supporters of wellness programs, as their 2016 report, Winning
with Wellness, demonstrates. 94 This report includes quotations that
misrepresent the views of the original authors. For example, RAND, a
nonprofit public-policy consulting organization, stated that
[e]mployee participation in lifestyle management aspects of
workplace wellness programs does not reduce healthcare utilization
or cost regardless of whether we focus on higher-risk employees or
those who are more engaged in the program. 95

The United States Chamber of Commerce interpreted RAND’s statement to
mean: “There is solid evidence to be optimistic.” 96
The Chamber of Commerce report also quoted RAND as finding a
“reduction of $30 in healthcare costs per member per month, after seven
years of continuous participation in either the lifestyle- or diseasehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-wellness-exclusiveidUSKCN0JD0AC20141129; Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, S. 620,
114th Cong. (2015).
89.

See LOVEMAN, supra note 88.

90.

Begley, supra note 88.

91.

Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, S. 620, 114th Cong. (2015).

92.

Employer Wellness Programs: Better Health Outcomes and Lower Costs: Before
the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, 114TH CONG. (Jan. 29, 2015),
available
at
https://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/employer-wellnessprograms-better-health-outcomes-and-lower-costs.

93.

See John Gizzi, Senate Health Panel Leaving Out Obamacare Opponents, NEWSMAX
(Jan.
28,
2015),
http://www.newsmax.com/US/senate-health-panelobamacare/2015/01/28/id/621367/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).

94.

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, WINNING WITH WELLNESS (2016).

95.

SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND CORP., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS: SERVICES OFFERED,
PARTICIPATION, AND INCENTIVES, at xvi (2014).

96.

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 94, at 17.
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management program.” 97 It fails to acknowledge, however, that the RAND
report qualified this finding by emphasizing that the thirty-dollar reduction
was an average of two very different figures for two very different
programs, and that when considering the cost of wellness programs
without disease-management programs, lifestyle-management programs
increased costs by about three dollars for every dollar saved. 98
In 2017, the American Benefits Council (“ABC”) joined this group, and
actively lobbied for H.R. 1313, the newer version of the Preserving
Employee Wellness Programs Act. As will be described, this version would
allow employers to collect DNA from employees and their dependents,
including children, as part of workplace wellness. 99
As the above examples demonstrate, supporters of wellness programs
are almost exclusively organizations and individuals that profit from
them. 100 On the other hand, unaffiliated economists and members of the
media who have opined on wellness programs almost uniformly disparage
them. 101 Echoing RAND’s conclusions, the New York Times-affiliated The
Incidental Economist wrote: “We’ve said it before, many times and in many
ways: workplace wellness programs don’t save money.” 102 A Los Angeles
Times business columnist called wellness a “scam” in 2014 103 and repeated
this word, in the context of H.R. 1313 in March 2017. 104 A Stanford
97.

Id. at 16.

98.

John P. Caloyeras et al., Managing Manifest Diseases, But Not Health Risks, Saved
PepsiCo Money Over Seven Years, 33 HEALTH AFF. 124, 128 (2014).

99.

Andie Burjek, New Wellness Bill HR 1313 Gets Flak for Genetic Privacy Concerns,
WORKFORCE (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.workforce.com/2017/03/20/newwellness-bill-gets-flack-for-genetic-privacy-concerns/.

100. HEALTH ENHANCEMENT RESEARCH ORG. & POPULATION HEALTH ALLIANCE, PROGRAM
MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION GUIDE: CORE METRICS FOR EMPLOYEE HEALTH MANAGEMENT 34 (2015) [hereinafter HERO Guide].
101. See, e.g., Al Lewis & Vik Khanna, The Ten Worst Wellness Programs and What They
Do to Harm Employees, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2015/12/04/the-ten-worst-wellnessprograms-and-what-they-do-to-harm-employees/; Anderson, supra note 29;
Judith Feder & Samuel R. Bagenstos, Beware: ‘Wellness” May be Hazardous to
POST
(May
11,
2015),
Your
Health,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judith-feder/corporate-wellnessprograms_b_6846350.html.
102. Austin Frakt, Workplace wellness programs don’t save money, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST
(Dec.
2,
2014,
6:00
AM),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/workplace-wellness-programsdont-save-money/.
103. See Michael Hiltzik, Why ‘wellness’ program scams cost employers and harm
employees, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/lafi-mh-how-wellness-programs-cost-employers-and-harm-employees-20141202column.html.
104. Michael Hiltzik, This Republican bill would let your employer demand access to
TIMES
(Mar.
14,
2017),
your
genetic
information,
L.A.
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researcher wrote in Harvard Business Review that “in [their] quest to
increase employee wellness . . . organizations are often unwittingly making
things worse.” 105
As mentioned, RAND concludes that wellness loses more than three
dollars for every dollar spent. At a conference on wellness at Case Western
Reserve University in 2016, RAND’s Soeren Mattke offered impromptu
advice for his own employer, which still offers a wellness program: “RAND,
to my chagrin, still has a wellness program. I keep telling them give me the
$150 [in vendor fees], that would make me a lot . . . happier . . . and [more]
motivated, if you just give me the money and do away with the silly
program.” 106 While wellness vendors presumably profit from wellness
programs and forfeitures from non-participants, wellness done to
employees has been a failure in outcomes, economics, and clinical impact.
These three areas in which they fail have also created an environment in
which major ethical lapses are necessary in order to sustain the industry
revenue stream.

IV. The Proven Failure of Wellness: Outcomes, Economics, Clinical
Impact, and Ethics
In a typical scientific debate, advocates of opposing viewpoints offer
equally opposing scientific proofs based on their own investigations and
their own data sets and then challenge the other side’s data. In this debate,
however, a proof that wellness programs fail need not rely on its own data
set or on challenging industry data. Instead, the data the wellness industry
provides in support of its programs invariably invalidates itself when read
closely. 107
Rather than using a debatable scientific level of proof, most wellness
programs’ data can be invalidated using a dispositive mathematical level of
proof. The difference, to use a legal analogy, is that a scientific level of proof
would go to the jury, whereas a mathematical level of proof can be decided
in summary judgment. Even assuming that the data the wellness industry
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-wellness-genome20170313-story.html.
105. Emma Seppala, Good Bosses Create More Wellness than Wellness Plans Do, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Apr. 8, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/good-bosses-create-morewellness-than-wellness-plans-do.
106. CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, Corporate Wellness Programs: Are they
Hazardous to Well-Being? (1), YOUTUBE, at 25:30 (Apr. 19, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PPyBZcDFeKM.
107. See, e.g., Al Lewis & Vik Khanna, British Petroleum’s Wellness Program is Spewing
CARE
BLOG
(July
10,
2013),
Invalidity,
HEALTH
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2013/07/10/british-petroleums-wellnessprogram-is-spewing-invalidity/; Bruce Shutan, Wellness ROI Comes Under Fire,
BENEFIT
NEWS
(Jan.
8,
2016),
EMPLOYEE
http://www.benefitnews.com/news/wellness-roi-comes-under-fire;
Begley,
supra note 10.
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provides is correct, the conclusion is clear: wellness programs lose money
for employers. Three data sets, directly or indirectly 108 attributable to the
wellness industry, are used in this proof.
A.

The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project

The first data set that proves wellness loses money is a database
sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”)
called the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (“HCUP”). 109 HCUP tracks
hospital admissions over time using diagnosis codes. It is the “largest set of
all-payer healthcare databases that are publicly available.” 110 HCUP’s
drawback is that, as of this writing, it is four years out of date. However, for
2014, 2015, and 2016, the Disease Management Purchasing Consortium
(“DPMC”) used a similar methodology on a much smaller sample size to
track admissions, yielding a continuation of the same trend lines. 111
B.

Everett Koop Award Applications

The second data set comes from applications for the C. Everett Koop
Award (“Koop”), an award given to “exemplary” wellness programs. The
Health Project awards the Koop to wellness programs it identifies as
“exemplary health promotion and disease prevention programs.” 112 It is
fair, then, to cite the Koop-winning programs as representative of the most
effective programs that the industry offers. Applications for this award
contain a number of admissions against interest by prominent wellnessindustry executives and vendors. These statements are not issues of fact
because the executives made these statements and have not retracted
them.
C.

The HERO Program Metric and Evaluation Guide

The third data set is the largest wellness-industry trade organization,
the Health Enhancement Research Organization (“HERO”). In 2015, HERO
published the Program Metric and Evaluation Guide (“HERO Guide” or
“Guide”). 113 The Guide’s acknowledgments page lists twenty-five
108. The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project database is compiled for the
government by Watson Health, which also advocates wellness. There is no
allegation that the data is biased in favor of wellness as a result of this provenance,
but rather that there is no reason to think the data would be biased against
wellness.
109. See generally HCUP, supra note 62.
110. See Id.
INST.,
111. See,
e.g.,
Providence
Health
Plan,
VALIDATION
http://www.validationinstitute.com/validated-organizations/#providencehealth-plans (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (noting Providence Health Plan’s event rate
trend through 2015).
112. See generally C. Everett Koop National Health Awards, HEALTH PROJECT,
www.thehealthproject.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
113. HERO Guide, supra note 100.
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collaborators, four endorsers, six members of the steering committee, and
seventeen “subject-matter experts.” 114 HERO describes those who
collaborated on the Guide as “among the most credible and conscientious
scientists and practitioners working in corporate wellness today.” 115 The
first chapter of the HERO Guide states that it represents “two years and
countless hours of research and discussions by more than 60 members of
both organizations and many outside experts.” 116 The word “consensus”
appears fifteen times in the Guide’s eighty-nine pages. 117 Based on these
credentials, it appears that the HERO Guide indeed represents the wellnessindustry leaders’ consensus, as it claims to do.
1. Outcomes: The Failure of Wellness to Reduce Wellness-Sensitive Medical
Admissions

Wellness-sensitive medical admissions (“WSMAs”) include heart
attacks, diabetes-related health events, and other admissions that are, at
least in part, reasonably attributable to poor lifestyle choices. The Guide
states that “WSMAs are the most important metric for determining
program success” 118 in that a good wellness program should reduce
WSMAs. Researchers in Health Affairs, 119 the Validation Institute, 120 and the
field’s only outcomes-measurement textbook, Why Nobody Believes the
Numbers: Distinguishing Fact from Fiction in Population Health
Management, 121 also use WSMAs to track outcomes and would agree that
a good wellness program should reduce them.
Using the HCUP database that the AHRQ compiles, Figure 2 tracks all
admissions data for the privately insured population, such that it captures
the entire population exposed to workplace wellness programs, estimated
114. Id. at 3.
115. Unsolicited letter from HERO Board of Directors, to selected members of the
media, who can be identified to interested parties following the consummation of
a non-disclosure agreement (Dec. 1, 2015) (on file with Author); Al Lewis, HERO’s
Paul Terry, Ron Goetzel, Seth Serxner Admit to Fabricating Data, THEY SAID WHAT?
(Apr.
12,
2016)
[hereinafter
HERO
Data
Fabrication],
https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/04/12/hero-finally-forced-to-reveal-poison-penletter-they-circulated-to-the-media/
(providing
excerpts
from
the
correspondence from HERO to Harvard Business Review).
116. HERO Guide, supra note 100, at 3.
117. See generally Id.
118. Id. at 22-23.
119. Gautam Gowrisankaran et al., A Hospital System’s Wellness Program Linked to
Health Plan Enrollment Cut Hospitalizations but Not Overall Costs, 32 HEALTH AFF.
477 (Mar. 2013).
120. See generally Validating Performance in Healthcare, VALIDATION INST.,
www.validationinstitute.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
121. ALFRED LEWIS, WHY NOBODY BELIEVES THE NUMBERS: DISTINGUISHING FACT FROM FICTION IN
POPULATION HEALTH MANAGEMENT (2012).
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at sixty-six million people. 122 There are roughly 154 million people covered
in the category HCUP calls the “privately insured” population. 123 The figure
tracks the privately insured population against the remaining United States
population over the thirteen-year period during which the wellness
industry has grown dramatically. The figure also tracks the rate of WSMAs
listed in the HERO Guide—hypertension, stroke, heart attack and
diabetes—against the admissions rate for everything else. 124
If wellness works, the rate of these targeted WSMAs should be
decreasing in the population exposed to wellness programs, even though
many insured people lack access to them, at a rate higher than their
decrease in the reference population. If wellness works, there should be
separation between the two population trend lines. If the privately insured
population trends flat, the reference population would increase
significantly, or if the reference population trends flat, the privately insured
population rate would decrease significantly. Instead, both lines trend flat,
meaning that applying workplace wellness to the privately insured

122. Karen Pollitz & Matthew Rae, Workplace Wellness Programs Characteristics and
Requirements, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 4, 2016), http://kff.org/privateinsurance/issue-brief/workplace-wellness-programs-characteristics-andrequirements/.
123. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
124. The specific ICD9s are: hypertension and stroke, ICD-9 401 to 405, 430 to 438;
heart attacks, 410; diabetes, 250.
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population had no discernable impact between 2001 and 2013. This trend
has continued since 2013. 125

Figure 2. There has been no decrease in WMSAs among those with access to wellness
programs.

Wellness supporters could argue that wellness programs are successful
but affect too few employees to influence the overall trend line since only
forty-two percent of employees have access to wellness programs. That
argument, however, meets an insurmountable mathematical hurdle. All
employers combined spend only $11.3 billion on WSMAs. 126 This means
that only $4.8 billion—forty-two percent of employer spending on
WSMAs—spent on WSMAs are spent on people with access to wellness
programs. If the industry size were $4.8 billion or less, it would be possible
to break even if wellness programs did a perfect job. However, the industry
size is estimated at seven billion dollars. 127 Thus, savings are impossible, no
matter what the degree of inflection in the trend line. That the trend line
shows no inflection compounds the mathematical impossibility of savings.
This creates an argument in the alternative: wellness cannot save money,
mathematically speaking, and even if it could, it hasn’t.
The HERO Guide acknowledges that wellness programs lose money, but
describes far more modest losses than the math dictates. The HERO Guide
125. The continuation of this trend since 2013 is based on data compiled by and
available upon request from the author.
126. HERO Guide, supra note 100, at 23 (calculated using the HERO Guide’s estimate
of $22,500 per admission).
127. IBISWORLD, CORPORATE WELLNESS SERVICES IN THE US: MARKET RESEARCH REPORT (2015).
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states that vendor fees for a wellness program are, on average, $1.50 per
employee per month (“PEPM”), or about eighteen dollars per year.128 A
simple division of the seven-billion-dollar industry by the sixty-six million
affected employees, however, yields vendor fees averaging almost six times
HERO’s vastly understated $1.50 PEPM—or eighteen-dollar per employee
per year—figure.
The HERO Guide lists savings as ninety-nine cents PEPM, resulting in
approximately $11.88 in savings per employee every year. 129 Even if
employers did save approximately $11.88 per employee, their wellness
programs would lose approximately six dollars per employee per year. In
correspondence circulated to members of the media and not intended for
publication, HERO’s board claims that, in creating the Guide, they
“fabricated” these numbers for the purpose of providing an example. 130
Publicly, Goetzel, a member of HERO’s board, stated that “[t]hose numbers
are wildly off . . . every number in that chapter has nothing to do with
reality.” 131
The chapter’s author, however, disputes the HERO board’s and
Goetzel’s claim that the numbers were fabricated. He argues that, quite the
contrary, the data is real and several board members, including Goetzel,
reviewed it prior to publication. 132 Reconciling the example’s data with the
HCUP database, which shows almost total consistency between the HERO
sample and the population, provides further evidence for the author’s claim
that the data is not “wildly off” but rather real, and a representative sample
of the privately insured American workforce. 133
Fabricated or not, to reconcile the example’s costs with their estimated
program savings, HERO’s board argues that the example program’s
estimated costs were not intended to be compared to the estimated

128. HERO Guide, supra note 100, at 15.
129. Id. at 23.
130. HERO Data Fabrication, supra note 115.
131. Al Lewis & Ron Goetzel, The Great Debate, POPULATION HEALTH ALLIANCE (Oct. 12,
2016), https://ccavoice.wordpress.com/?s=debate (providing a recording of a
debate between Al Lewis and Ron Goetzel, at minute 1:17); Al Lewis, And the
Envelope Please: The Best Outcomes Evaluator in Wellness Is . . . *, THEY SAID WHAT?
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://theysaidwhat.net/2017/01/30/and-the-envelope-pleasethe-best-outcomes-evaluator-in-wellness-is/ (providing a summary of The Great
Debate); see also Al Lewis, Ron Goetzel proves, definitively, that screening loses
money . . . and lots of it, THEY SAID WHAT? (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://theysaidwhat.net/2017/02/07/ron-goetzel-proves-definitively-thatscreening-loses-money-and-lots-of-it/ (providing an analysis of Goetzel’s most
recent admission against interest that he made in Ron Goetzel et al., Workplace
Programs, Policies, And Environmental Supports To Prevent Cardiovascular
Disease, 36 HEALTH AFF. 229 (2017)).
132. Lewis, supra note 131.
133. HCUP, supra note 62.
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savings described in the same chapter. 134 This departs from the norm;
typically, costs and savings are compared to determine a program’s costeffectiveness. To argue that costs are not supposed to be compared to
benefits appears specious.
2. Economics: Wellness Programs Lose More than a Dollar for Each Dollar
Spent

There are two pieces of evidence that show that wellness programs
actually cause healthcare spending to increase above and beyond vendor
fees themselves. The first is an admission against interest that HERO made.
The HERO Guide lists eleven elements of cost that increase due to wellness.
Along with direct costs, like fees and incentives, and indirect costs, like
employee time and legal review, a third category, “tangential” costs,
includes “employee morale and company reputation.” 135 The candor of this
third category reflects the number of high-profile cases in which wellness
programs damaged one or both, such as those introduced at Penn State, 136
CVS, 137 and Honeywell. 138 Some of these tangential costs cannot be
translated into dollars. The list also omits important and substantial costs
that increase as a result of wellness programs. For example, the Guide does
not mention consulting fees for vendor selection and program evaluation,
though they can be quantified and may be substantial. Consulting fees,
along with the remaining eleven direct and indirect cost items mentioned
above, are also excluded from the Guide’s later cost calculations. The Guide
includes only vendor fees, estimated at $1.50 PEPM, in its program-cost
calculation. 139
That above-described private correspondence from the HERO board
complained that a mathematical analysis conducted using the allegedly
fabricated data should have used real data. 140 Substituting Goetzel’s “real
data” 141 suggests that there are approximately $100 to $150 in costs per
year for each employee, rather than $1.50 PEPM, or eighteen dollars per
134. Id. at 22.
135. Id. at 10.
136. Singer, supra note 4.
137. Jillian Berman & Hunter Stuart, CVS Sued Over Controversial Wellness Program,
POST
(Mar.
20,
2014),
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/20/cvs-healthscreening_n_4986861.html.
138. Reed Abelson, Wellness Programs Use Carrots and, Increasingly, Sticks, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/business/employeewellness-programs-use-carrots-and-increasingly-sticks.html.
139. HERO Guide, supra note 100, at 22.
140. HERO Data Fabrication, supra note 115.
141. WELLSOURCE, INC., HOW MUCH DOES A GOOD WELLNESS PROGRAM COST? (2011), available
at
http://wellsource.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/How_Much_Should_a_Wellness_Program_Cost.pdf.
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year. 142 His data, therefore, actually dramatically increases the losses from
approximately six dollars per employee per year to eighty-eight dollars to
$138 per employee per year, even before the other elements of direct and
indirect cost are included. 143
Vendor fees and direct and indirect costs are administrative costs, not
costs paid directly in insurance claims. The cost of utilizing other services,
however, also increases, according to HERO. The Guide states:
It is important to recognize that [wellness programs] should increase
the use of certain services, such as preventive and screening services,
certain chronic medications, and outpatient visits. It is even possible
to see a rise in [emergency room] and urgent care visits.” 144

These healthcare expenses that HERO acknowledges and describes are
excluded from the savings calculation. These added expenses could easily
dwarf the ninety-nine cent PEPM savings before even considering the
vendor fees. HERO’s own statements, therefore, project losses from
wellness programs exceeding the wellness vendors’ fees.
Connecticut’s wellness program, for example, bears out the prediction
that wellness programs lose money. The results from its program, published
in 2016, show an increase in Connecticut’s healthcare spending. 145 The
state administrator, Kevin Lembo, contends that immediate cost increases
in preventive services would eventually lead to cost decreases. 146 He did not
provide any factual support for this contention. 147 The speculation is further
suspect because Connecticut’s preventive care schedule conflicts with the
USPSTF’s guidelines. He also failed to provide any explanation for why he
believes that flouting accepted guidelines for appropriate preventive care
will lead to eventual cost decreases.
1.

The Wellness Industry’s Admissions Against Interest

Every investigation conducted by investigators who are not connected
to the wellness industry shows losses. As Connecticut’s program
demonstrates, even investigations that were conducted by parties
supporting wellness programs show losses. The only investigations that
142. WELCOA, The Cost of Wellness: A WELCOA Expert Interview With Dr. Ron Goetzel
(July 21, 2010), https://www.scribd.com/document/34732477/The-Cost-ofWellness-A-WELCOA-Expert-Interview-With-Dr-Ron-Goetzel.
143. HERO Data Fabrication, supra note 115.
144. HERO Guide, supra note 100, at 22.
145. Richard A. Hirth et al., Connecticut’s Value-Based Insurance Plan Increased the Use
of Targeted Services And Medication Adherence, 35 HEALTH AFF. 637 (2016).
146. Arielle Levin Becker, Study: State Employee Wellness Plan Increased Use of
(Apr.
5,
2016),
Preventive
Services,
CTMIRROR
http://ctmirror.org/2016/04/05/study-state-employee-wellness-plan-increaseduse-of-preventive-care/.
147. Id.
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show savings, however, are the investigations conducted by wellness
supporters. Those, upon closer examination, self-invalidate, and as such
could be considered “admissions against interest”—the publication of data
that undermines the industry’s own position. The sample reviewed for this
article is extensive and includes peer-reviewed and Koop-winning
programs. As extensive as it is, it is just a sample—there are at least fifty
other vendors reporting substantial savings based on data that selfinvalidates. 148
HealthiestYou reported a greater reduction in emergency-room visits
than there were emergency-room visits to reduce. 149 Wellsteps reported
that costs decreased for its client, the Boise School District, but also
admitted elsewhere in the report that costs increased. 150 Wellnet reported
a reduction in undetected-claims cost that was a large multiple of total
healthcare claims cost, 151 but there is no such thing as “undetected claims
cost.” Staywell reported that it saved British Petroleum (“BP”) one hundred
times more than its own study says is possible 152 and won a Koop Award in
2014 for its report. 153 As is the case with most other Koop winners, both
Staywell—BP’s vendor—and Mercer—BP’s consulting firm—were
represented on the awards committee, 154 and as an award sponsor. 155 US
Corporate Wellness reported substantial savings on people whose health
did not improve 156 and separately reported that participants in their
wellness program were “230% less likely” to miss work than non148. The self-invalidation arithmetic for all fifty is available at www.theysaidwhat.net.
For examples of independent analyses questioning wellness economics see Frakt,
supra note 102; Begley, supra note 10.
149. Following the exposure of this fact, HealthiestYou removed any evidence of it
from their website. However, this statistic can be found by going to visit
www.theysaidwhat.net and entering “HealthiestYou” into the search function.
150. WELLSTEPS, THREE YEARS OF WORKSITE WELLNESS: A ZERO TREND CASE STUDY, available at
https://www.wellsteps.com/files/three_years_of_wellness.pdf (last visited Apr.
1, 2017).
151. WELLNET, Healthcare Case Studies 2011, SLIDESHARE, at slide 4 (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.slideshare.net/WellNet123/wellnet-healthcare-case-studies-2011.
152. Amanda McGrory-Dixon, Prevention Necessary for Reducing Health Care Costs,
(Nov.
22,
2012),
BENEFITSPRO
http://www.benefitspro.com/2012/11/22/prevention-necessary-for-reducinghealth-care-cost; Lewis & Khanna, supra note 107.
PROJECT,
153. See
generally
BP
America,
HEALTH
http://thehealthproject.com/winner/bp-america/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
154. See Board of Directors, HEALTH PROJECT, http://thehealthproject.com/aboutus/board-of-directors/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
155. See 2016-2017 Sponsors, HEALTH PROJECT, http://thehealthproject.com/sponsors/
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
156. Al Lewis, US Corporate Wellness Saves Money on People Who Don’t Cost Money,
THEY SAID WHAT? (July 30, 2014), https://theysaidwhat.net/2014/07/30/210/.
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participants. 157 This claim was removed from their website after it was
observed to be mathematically impossible. 158
The industry’s own trade association, HERO, was not the only wellness
promotion organization to show losses. The industry’s own trade
publication, the American Journal of Health Promotion (“AJHP”), did the
same. An attempt to confirm the Harvard Study’s findings showed savings,
but only in low-quality studies. 159 The AJHP’s meta-analysis found that
“randomized control trials . . . exhibited negative ROI.” 160
The former editor of AJHP, Michael O’Donnell, acknowledged as much.
In addition to graciously conceding that this author is “not an idiot” and is
“close to being accurate,” O’Donnell stated that “90% to 95% of programs
fail.” 161 Goetzel joins him in this opinion, indicating that “there is a group of
about 100 employers whose programs have really smart ingredients . . . but
thousands of others still don’t do wellness right and are not getting good
health outcomes.” 162 He did not mention any of these one hundred
employers by name, making it impossible to verify this claim. For the last
seven years, no peer-reviewed article in a major journal has found that
wellness programs lead to substantial risk reduction. Even award-winning
programs achieve only low-single-digit percentage reductions in risk
factors, excluding dropouts and non-participants.
By contrast, breaking even would require a very substantial reduction
in risk. Mike Tinney, the CEO of Fitness Interactive Experience,
acknowledges that finding an ROI in wellness requires a “leap of faith,” and
that breaking even on wellness is possible only with a fifty percent
reduction in heart attacks, 163 which would be twenty-five to fifty times the
typical one-percent to two-percent risk reduction that Goetzel claims is
achievable over a multiyear period. 164

157. Id.
158. The case study has been removed from the website but can be found in: US
CORPORATE WELLNESS, Wellness Program Case Study: The Children’s Hospital, DISEASE
MANAGEMENT,
available
at
http://www.dismgmt.com/sites/default/files/tch_case_study.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017).
159. Baxter et al., supra note 64.
160. Id. at 347 (However, “[f]inancial returns become increasingly positive across
quasi-experimental, nonexperimental, and modeled studies.”).
161. Michael O’Donnell, Does Workplace Health Promotion Work or Not? Are You Sure
You Really Want to Know the Truth?, 28 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION iv (2013).
162. Begley, supra note 10.
163. Mike Tinney, Belief in Wellness Savings May Require Leap of Faith, but They’re
Real, CFO (June 3, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/health-benefits/2015/06/beliefwellness-savings-may-require-leap-faith-theyre-real/#comment-857278.
164. Taylor, supra note 83.
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2.

Wellness Industry’s Methodologies for Measuring Savings Self-Invalidate

The wellness industry relies overwhelmingly on two methodologies to
show savings. The first is comparing participants, excluding dropouts, to
non-participants. The second is pointing out reductions in risk factors for
employees at high risk for disease. 165 Both methodologies self-invalidate
based on wellness vendors’ own studies, confirming that both
methodologies show savings where none exist.
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) does not allow participantversus-non-participant comparison studies. Instead, in order to equalize
subjects’ motivations to participate, they divide would-be participants into
study and control groups. 166 By contrast, wellness industry participantversus-non-participant studies do not count or track dropouts or
acknowledge that counting dropouts could change results. While no data is
tallied on dropouts because a study cannot follow up with them, it appears
likely that people drop out because they are failing rather than because
they are succeeding, an assumption with which HERO concurs. 167 It seems
even likelier that dropouts occur due to participants’ failures to achieve
results if participants who succeed and complete the program receive a
monetary reward, as is usually the case in wellness programs.
As a result, the investigations that wellness advocates conduct appear
to show savings because the participation effect—active participants’
motivations as compared to motivations of non-participants and
dropouts—is not isolated from the program effect—the impact of the
actual intervention.
What if these two effects could be isolated? What if there were
situations in which:

165. See Al Lewis, How the 2016 Koop Award Raises Lying to an Art Form, THEY SAID
WHAT? (Sept. 28, 2016), https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/09/28/this-morningskoop-award-raising-lying-to-an-art-form/ (Comparing comments made by
Wellsteps’ CEO, Steve Aldana, regarding employees with high risk factors in One
of the Nation’s Best Wellness Programs, WELLSTEPS (July 15, 2016),
https://www.wellsteps.com/blog/2016/07/15/koop-award/, to comments made
by Mr. Aldana in Begley, supra note 10. The former credits the program with the
reduction while the latter acknowledges the “regression to the mean” that causes
outliers as a group to tend towards the average over time).
166. Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Apr.
11,
2016),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm
.
167. HERO Guide, supra note 100, at 17 (“For example, sometimes savings due to
lifestyle risk reduction is calculated on the 20% of the population that supplied
appropriate data. It’s assumed that the other 80% didn’t change but if some of
the people who didn’t supply risk factor data worsened, and people who got
worse were less likely to report their data, that model would overestimate
savings.”).
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1. Participants were separated from non-participants, but not
offered a program in which to participate?
2. A program gave demonstrably bad advice, the advice was taken,
and participants still showed savings?
3. A controlled experiment tested participation impact against
program impact?

The wellness industry uses studies like the ones described above to justify
its programs. Each study is peer-reviewed or Koop Award-winning, and
wellness supporters conducted all of them, eliminating investigator bias. 168
Eastman Chemical’s wellness program, operated by Health Fitness
Corporation, follows the first scenario; its study showed savings without
offering a program in which employees could participate. 169 The figure
below, a major part of Eastman Chemical and Health Fitness Corporation’s
Koop-winning application, clearly claims that it saved money on healthcare
before it even began offering its program. 170 Their application claimed the
program was saving $359 per year per employee before the program
actually started. 171

168. See Wellness Outcomes, supra note 77 (providing a more detailed analysis of the
invalidity of the participants-vs-non-participants study design).
PROJECT,
169. See
generally
Eastman
Chemical,
HEALTH
http://thehealthproject.com/winner/eastman-chemical-healthe-connections/
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
170. Id. (providing this figure in the 2011 Koop Award Application; to view, select
“Evaluation Documentation” and scroll to the end, the graph appears without the
x-axis, which was removed altogether in December 2014, as explained in the
“Erratum” statement).
171. Wellness Outcomes, supra note 77 (showing $2432 vs. $2073, the 2006
comparison of participants vs. non-participants).
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Figure 3. Eastman Chemical/Health Fitness Corporation Participants versus NonParticipants display, with original axis labeling 172

In 2014, after The Incidental Economist critiqued the study in Health
Affairs, the Koop committee removed the x-axis from the award
application. 173 Absent the original screenshot, the alteration of the chart
would have prevented readers from seeing it in its original form. Whereas
the original version clearly shows separation absent a program in the initial
two years, the revised version, lacking the x-axis, makes it impossible for
readers to realize that the alleged savings occurred before the program
even began. Goetzel then wrote in Health Affairs that the “original is online
and subject to review,” 174 when, in fact, only the revised version was
available for review. 175

172. This screenshot was taken from the 2011 application for the Koop Award from
Eastman
Chemical
and
Health
Fitness
Corporation
from
www.thehealthproject.com, before it was altered in December 2014.
PROJECT,
173. Eastman
Chemical
Evaluation
Documentation,
HEALTH
http://thehealthproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EastmanEval.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
174. Ron Goetzel, The Value of Workplace Health Promotion (Wellness) Programs,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 22, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/12/22/thevalue-of-workplace-health-promotion-wellness-programs/.
175. Al Lewis et al., Workplace Wellness Produces No Savings, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov.
25,
2014),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/11/25/workplace-wellnessproduces-no-savings/ (providing the original version); Eastman Chemical
Evaluation Documentation, supra note 173 (showing the later version with the x-
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Figure 4. Screenshot of the Eastman Chemical/Health Fitness Corporation Koop Award
application display following the 2014 removal of the axis labels, taken in 2015.

Regardless of the x-axis, by the end of the 2008, Eastman Chemical
reported that savings for program participants exceeded nine hundred
dollars per year, but its application for the Koop reports revealed that
average participant’s risk declined only 0.17 on a scale of zero to five—
about three percent—excluding dropouts. 176 A three percent decline in risk
would lead one to expect, at maximum, a three percent decline in wellnesssensitive medical admissions. Rounding for simplicity, a three percent
decline in two percent of spending yields roughly a 0.06 percent decline in
total healthcare spending by 2008, not twenty-four percent, as the chart
above claims. This is a four hundred-fold overstatement of the likely result.
None of the Koop committee members, nor Eastman Chemical or Health
Fitness Corporation, attempted to explain the discrepancy. 177
This example, though it is award-winning and peer-reviewed, clearly
overstated its wellness program’s impact on savings. It is one of many
award-winning and peer-reviewed wellness programs that attributes
substantial savings to very small reductions in risk factors. 178 Wellness
axis removed); Lewis & Goetzel, supra note 130 (showing the juxtaposed version
in Part 4 of The Great Debate, at 40:50)
176. Eastman Chemical Evaluation Documentation, supra note 173, at Section D.
177. Eastman Chemical, supra note 168 (showing the 2014 acknowledgement of the
2012 exposition of the error was posted in an “Erratum”).
178. A further demonstration of this point: as this article was going to press, Health
Fitness Corporation published a case study showing $586 in savings for employees
who gained 9 ounces less than the control group, which translates to a savings of
roughly $1041 per pound of weight not gained. New Research Demonstrates
Participation in Coaching Moves the Needle, BUSINESS WIRE (Feb. 7, 2017),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170207006047/en/ResearchDemonstrates-Participation-Coaching-Moves-Needle.
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affects only a small number of WSMAs, and therefore can only affect a small
percentage of all healthcare spending. 179
Another study, conducted by Stanford researchers, alleged that it
reduced costs by $397 per participant in the first six months of participation
in a program that involved placing participants on a low-fat diet. 180 The
study attributes its substantial savings to its participants consuming less fat
and more carbohydrates, which is the opposite of what most dietary
experts currently recommend. 181 Because participant risk factors declined
only 2.2 percent, the advice provided was demonstrably incorrect, and the
program could not have had such a short-term impact even if the advice it
provided had been correct, the only factor that could explain this
otherwise-inexplicable result is that participants will always outperform
non-participants. What they ate or did not eat over twenty-six weeks could
have had no meaningful bearing on this outcome. Despite its obvious
invalidity, this study was selected for inclusion in Harvard Study described
above, tainting the overall 3.27-to-1 ROI result. 182
A study of Aetna’s wellness program showed that there was no change
in the study group’s risk factors, but still showed a reduction in cost of
$1464 the program’s first year. 183 This study divided a cohort of healthy
Aetna employees into three groups: the control group and two study
groups. The study groups were a participant group including only those who
were invited to participate in the study and accepted the invitation, and a
non-participant group including only those who were invited to participate
in the study and declined the invitation. 184
This study design contrasted results that an RCT generated with the
results the wellness industry’s preferred participants-versus-nonparticipants design generates. 185 The RCT—the gold standard in the field of
statistics—showed that Aetna’s wellness program had no discernable,
179. HERO Guide, supra note 100, at 23 (Stating between 2.62 and 3.14 WSMAs/ 1000
members out of a total of roughly 40 all-cause admissions, excluding birth-related
events; roughly a third of so-called WSMAs are respiratory or heart failurerelated—these are not found through screens. That leaves between about 1.4 and
2.1 admissions/1000 to be theoretically avoidable through screening.).
180. See Fries & McShane, supra note 71.
181. Id.; see also Kris Gunnars, 23 Studies on Low-Carb and Low-Fat Diets: Time to
Retire the Fad, AUTHORITY NUTRITION, https://authoritynutrition.com/23-studies-onlow-carb-and-low-fat-diets/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
182. See Baicker et al., supra note 43.
183. See Gregory Steinberg et al., Reducing Metabolic Syndrome Risk Using a
Personalized Wellness Program, 57 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 1269, 1270
(2015).
184. Id.
DEP’T
EDU.,
185. See
Random
Controlled
Trials
(RCTs),
ARIZ.
https://cms.azed.gov/home/GetDocumentFile?id=589894d91130c10cbc242e42
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017); see also Wellness Outcomes, supra note 77.
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clinically significant differential impact on health indicators between the
study and control groups. 186
Nor should there have been any difference between the study and
control groups. The cohort was designed to include only subjects who had
not been diagnosed with a major chronic disease. 187 Participants were
selected either because they had metabolic syndrome or were at risk for
developing metabolic syndrome, a condition that puts patients at risk for
diabetes or heart attack. 188 In other words, part of the cohort was at risk
only for being at risk for having a disease, but not actually at risk for having
a disease. None of the study group actually had heart disease or diabetes.
A sudden reduction in costs by $1464 per participant, as the Aetna
study’s authors claim occurred, would require a reduction in sudden events,
such as heart attacks. However, the baseline heart-attack rate was already
zero—people who had experienced heart attacks were excluded from the
study because they had already been diagnosed with heart disease. 189 Thus,
it would be impossible to save money by reducing the heart-attack rate.
With the impossibility of reducing the heart-attack rate and the
questionable theory behind getting employees to lose weight, it was no
surprise that the study showed exactly the opposite of what its sponsors
had hoped to show: their program had no impact on its participants’
wellness. The comparison between the control and study groups showed
trivial relative changes in risk factors that were statistically insignificant. 190
Though there was no statistically significant change in risk factors
between the two groups, the subset of participants in the invited group
allegedly saved $1464 as compared to the non-participants. 191 Because
there was no overall difference between the study and control groups’
performances, only participation bias could explain the discrepancy
between the two results. The investigators, who work for Aetna—which
markets this wellness program—did not acknowledge the RCT results and
instead highlighted the participants-versus-non-participants result. They
knew or should have known this result was implausible, given the short time
frame, the RCT results, and that the subjects were at low risk. 192 The
186. Al Lewis, Genetic Testing: The New Frontier of Wellness Madness, HEALTH CARE BLOG
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2015/12/16/genetic-testingthe-new-frontier-of-wellness-madness/; Steinberg et al., supra note 183.
187. Lewis, supra note 186.
188. Steinberg et al., supra note 183, at 1269 (noting that metabolic syndrome is “a
constellation of five risk factors . . . . An individual with at least three . . . qualifies
as having [metabolic syndrome].” Study participants were selected if they had at
least two.).
189. See generally Id. (omitting the heart attack rate as a factor).
190. Id. at 1273, Table 3; see also Lewis, supra note 186.
191. Steinberg et al., supra note 183, at Table 4 (noting $312 per month for participants
vs. $434 per month for non-participants, or $1464 per year).
192. Id.
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decision to suppress their own study drew a rebuke from Mattke, who
wrote: “I congratulate the authors on planning to subject their intervention
to such a rigorous analysis, but wish they had actually applied this rigor to
the analysis.” 193
Additionally, a member of the editorial advisory board of the journal in
which this study appeared wrote:
I have long been on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Occupational
and Environmental Medicine. However, I was not involved in the peer
review or Editorial decisions regarding the Aetna study. If I had been,
the issues Al Lewis is raising would have been considered, if not
determinative. 194

Wellness providers also take credit for the natural flow of risk. Suppose
one hundred coins are heads up on the table. If you flip them, about fifty
will land tails-up. Likewise, a hypothetical company offering a program to
flip heads to tails would generally show a fifty percent success rate if all the
coins were heads to begin with. To be fair, that program should also count
tails flipping to heads. No one would believe a result that counted only
heads flipping to tails and not the reverse and then claimed credit for a fifty
percent reduction in heads. In the wellness industry, however, as the
Wellsteps example showed, it is quite common for wellness vendors to
count only high-risk participants who reduce risk factors, but not low-risk
participants whose risk factors increase. 195 For example, vendors will count
people who lose weight but not people who gain weight, 196 or will count
193. See Soeren Mattke, Comment on Steinberg et al: Reducing Metabolic Syndrome
Risk Using a Personalized Wellness Program, 58 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED.
e114, e114 (2016).
194. See Nortin Hadler, Comment to Al Lewis, in Genetic Testing: The New Frontier of
CARE
BLOG
(Dec.
16,
2015),
Wellness
Madness,
HEALTH
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2015/12/16/genetic-testing-the-newfrontier-of-wellness-madness/.
195. See, e.g., Al Lewis, ShapeUp Falls Down Trying To Do Math For Highmark, THEY SAID
WHAT? (July 23, 2014), https://theysaidwhat.net/2014/07/23/shapeup001/
(Noting that 163 people out of roughly 11,000 participants were reported to have
reduced their BMI classification from obese to overweight or overweight to
normal weight, but none of the 11,000 were disclosed to have gained weight.
Highmark fired ShapeUp for failure to perform.); Steve Twedt, Are Worker
Wellness Plans Best for Business?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:00
AM),
http://www.post-gazette.com/business/healthcarebusiness/2015/03/03/Worker-wellness-plans-called-into-question-but-othersdefend-it/stories/201503030025; Leonard L. Berry et al., What’s the Hard Return
on
Employee
Wellness
Programs?,
HARV.
BUS.
REV.
(2010),
https://hbr.org/2010/12/whats-the-hard-return-on-employee-wellnessprograms (“Of those classified as high risk when the study started (according to
body fat, blood pressure, anxiety, and other measures), 57% were converted to
low-risk status by the end of the six-month program.”).
196. Lewis, supra note 195.
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people who stop smoking but not people who resume or begin. In reality,
people’s risk factors are almost equally likely to increase as decrease. 197
An instructive example from Interactive Health and its evaluators, Zoe
Consulting, shows the natural flow of risk clearly, with only a 5.3 percent
net reduction in risk factors, excluding dropouts and non-participants. 198
The study asserted that the wellness program resulted in eight-figure
savings, even though only 278 more people reduced risk than increased it
out of the 22,500 people studied. 199 A subsequent version of report from
which this instructive example was extracted now omits the table, as well
as any acknowledgement of the one-percent net favorable risk migration or
explanation how such a trivial risk reduction could support the eight-figure
savings claims. In percentages, Interactive Health is now claiming that this
evaluation, with its one-percent reduction in risk, generated a twentypercent cost savings. 200
Wellsteps, too, only tracks improvements in people with the “worst
health behaviors.” 201 This is essentially the same thing as only counting
heads-to-tails, and an excellent example of a vendor taking credit for
regression to the mean. Originally, Wellsteps attributed these “dramatic
improvements” in Figure 5 to the “program impact.” 202 For example, the
number of alcoholic drinks that people with the “worst health behaviors”
self-reported that they imbibed fell from 1.31 per day to 1.10 per day, a
change for which Wellsteps took credit. It is also worth noting that selfreporting is generally unreliable, 203 and that the 691 respondents in this
chart equal the 691 who admitted to drinking alcohol at all, meaning that
Wellsteps considers any alcohol consumption a “worst health behavior.”
Further, 691 is only about twenty-three percent of the total number of

197. EDINGTON, supra note 70, at 10; EDINGTON ASSOC., NATURAL FLOW: BY RISK STATUS 2 (Apr.
5,
2016),
available
at
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/dr._dee_edington.pdf.
198. ZOE CONSULTING, INC., INTERACTIVE HEALTH WORKSITE WELLNESS PROGRAM LOWERS MEDICAL
COSTS AND INCREASES PRODUCTIVITY 9 (last viewed Apr. 1, 2017) (on file with author).
199. See INTERACTIVE HEALTH& ZOE CONSULTING, INC., PROOF POSITIVE: STUDY DEMONSTRATES
INTERACTIVE HEALTH OUTCOMES-BASED WELLNESS PROGRAM LOWERS MEDICAL COSTS AND
INCREASES
PRODUCTIVITY
5,
http://interactivehealthinc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/Claim-Study-Research-Summary-InteractiveHealth.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
200. Interactive Health Honors Employers with Top Workplace Wellness Programs, PR
NEWSWIRE
(Apr.
11,
2017),
http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/interactive-health-honors-employers-with-top-workplace-wellnessprograms-300437763.html.
201. WELLSTEPS, supra note 150, at 3.
202. Aldana, supra note 165.
203. Rob Hoskin, The Dangers of Self-Report, SCIENCE BRAINWAVES (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://www.sciencebrainwaves.com/the-dangers-of-self-report/.
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employees. Since roughly seventy percent of adults drink alcohol, 204 it is
likely that roughly forty-seven percent simply lied and Wellsteps did not
notice, or noticed but did not disclose it.

Figure 5. Wellsteps’ table displaying the downward flow of risk.

In a subsequent exposé by STATNews’ Sharon Begley about
Wellsteps’ wellness program, Wellsteps’ Chief Executive Officer, Steve
Aldana, acknowledged that cherry-picking only those employees with the
“worst health behaviors” was invalid, stating:
In just one year, many employees will move from one [risk] group to
the other even though they did not participate in any wellness
programs or any intervention whatsoever. [That movement] reflects
changes in health risks that occur naturally, even though your
program didn’t do anything. 205

Even peer-reviewed wellness studies will use a cohort comprised mostly of
people with few risk factors as a control for high-risk participants, taking
advantage of the fact that the latter will benefit from regression to the
mean. For example, one study declared that it “compared the reductions in
cost and health risk of a health education program aimed at high-risk
persons with a similar program addressed to all risk levels.” 206 Since most
people are at low risk, even in the absence of a program, high-risk subjects’
risk levels will fall farther than low-risk subjects’ risk levels simply because
they have farther to fall, regardless of the intervention. Or, to wrap up the
coin analogy, one-hundred heads will likely decline by fifty, to fifty heads
and fifty tails, while sixty heads and forty tails will also likely flip to fifty

204. Alcohol Facts and Statistics, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM (Feb. 2017),
https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcoholconsumption/alcohol-facts-and-statistics (showing seventy percent of adults have
had alcohol in the last year).
205. Begley, supra note 10.
206. Fries & McShane, supra note 71.
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heads and fifty tails, declining only by ten. Comparing their respective
reductions ignores the built-in bias of having farther to fall.
3.

The Clinical Impact of Wellness Programs

Losses might be acceptable if these programs improved employee
health status. One could then optimistically infer that someday costs might
fall a little, assuming the health-status improvements are maintained. That
assumes, however, that health status improves in the first place. Aetna’s
program, for example, did not improve the study group’s health indicators,
despite a five-hundred-dollar cost per participant. 207
Even Koop-winning programs achieve, at best, only single-digit
reductions in risk factors, and the two most recent award examples
achieved none. 208 The 2015 winner was McKesson. Even though they
excluded dropouts and non-participants, employees did not improve in
objective biometric testing. 209

Figure 6. McKesson risk factor changes as reported in its Koop Award application,
highlighting increases to elevated risk in red and decreases to low risk in green.

In the McKesson program, body-mass index (“BMI”), cholesterol, and
glucose all worsened. 210 Systolic and diastolic blood pressure improved
slightly, as did cotinine, an objective marker of tobacco use. 211 The
increased-to-elevated-risk and decreased-to-low-risk columns both sum to
fifty-eight percent, meaning there was no net change in risk. Despite the
program’s failure to improve risk on balance, McKesson nonetheless
alleged substantial savings. 212 McKesson even hired a graduate student to
207. Steinberg et al., supra note 183.
208. Al Lewis, Albert Einstein Meets the C. Everett Koop Wellness Award, THEY SAID
WHAT? (Dec. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Albert Einstein Meets Koop],
https://theysaidwhat.net/2015/12/02/albert-einstein-meets-the-c-everett-koopwellness-award/.
209. MCKESSON CORP., 2015 C. EVERETT KOOP NATIONAL HEALTH AWARD FOR EXCELLENCE IN HEALTH
IMPROVEMENT
AND
COST
SAVINGS
(2015),
available
at
http://thehealthproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/McKesson_KoopAward-Application-2015.pdf .
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Shutan, supra note 107.

36

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
The Outcomes, Economics and Ethics of the Workplace Wellness Industry

claim the program had led to savings and to explain how weight could
increase and decrease at the same time. 213 The wellness industry claims
that reducing risk generates savings. If, as with McKesson, it turns out that
risk did not decline, one must conclude that the savings were fabricated.
McKesson is not alone in winning a Koop while accomplishing no
meaningful risk reduction. 214 The table below includes a list of the winners
from previous years, together with their risk reduction. To give the
programs the benefit of the doubt, risk-reduction percentages include selfreported risk reduction, as in the Wellsteps example above, in which all the
responses were self-reported. Self-reported risk reduction is almost always
greater than biometric risk reduction. This is not just because people are
observed to lie on these surveys, as with Wellsteps. Often, employees can
only procure the best coverage options if they say they have completed
certain tasks or changed health behaviors. 215
To further confer the benefit of the doubt, in each case below the risk
reduction among active participants, excluding dropouts, is spread across
the entire population.
Year

Winner

2016
2015
2014
2012
2011
2010

Wellsteps/Boise School Dist.

McKesson
British Petroleum

Nebraska state employees

Eastman Chemical
Pfizer

Risk Reduction
(including self-reported)
Risk factors increased. 216
1%
3%
1%
2%
2%

Figure 7. Table describing company-wide risk reduction in Koop-winning programs. 217

In addition to the best programs’ failures to make meaningful
reductions in risk factors, another data point that shows the wellness
industry in its most favorable light is the single reported instance of a
213. Id.
214. Albert Einstein Meets Koop, supra note 208.
215. Fred Golstein, Update to: The Dodo Bird and Employee Wellness Programs – The
AH!
ACCOUNTABLE
HEALTH
(Nov.
6,
2016),
Phone
Call,
https://accountablehealth.wordpress.com/2016/05/05/the-dodo-bird-andemployee-wellness-programs-the-phone-call/.
216. Begley, supra note 10; Al Lewis, Protecting Employees from Harmful Wellness
Vendors: A Wake-Up Call, AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE (Oct. 10, 2016),
http://www.ajmc.com/contributor/al-lewis-jd/2016/10/protecting-employeesfrom-harmful-vendored-wellness-programs-a-wake-up-call.
217. The 2013 winner is excluded due to conflict-of-interest; this list of winners and
risk reduction figures are drawn from www.thehealthproject.com. See the years
and the respective applications. The summary can be found at Albert Einstein
Meets Koop, supra note 208.
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wellness company employing a wellness program for its own employees. 218
Both investigator bias and self-selection bias suggest that there would be a
favorable outcome. The wellness company in question, however, Vitality
Group, reported both an increase in BMI and a deterioration in its
employees’ eating habits in response to its wellness program for its parent
corporation, Discovery Health. 219 If a wellness company cannot reduce its
own employees’ weight, it would be unreasonable to expect it to reduce
other companies’ employees’ weights. Just as failing to achieve financial
savings might be acceptable if employee health improved, failure to
improve employees’ health might be acceptable if there were not also a
good chance that it will cause harm to employees.
Since 1998, Congress has authorized the USPSTF to determine the value
of preventive-care screenings. 220 It assigns grades to common screening
tests. An A or a B means that the benefits of undergoing the screening
exceed the harms. A D means that the test should not be done because the
harms it can cause exceed the potential benefits. In addition to scoring the
tests themselves, the USPSTF proposes the frequency at which people
should undergo many tests to prevent over-screening. It may not seem
logical that too much prevention is bad, but it is. 221
The harms of over-medicalization, and over-screening in particular, are
well-documented. 222 The harms and shortcomings of over-screening
include:
1. false positives, causing people to seek unnecessary and possibly
harmful follow-up medical care; 223
2. false negatives, causing people to become complacent if they
experience unexplained symptoms; 224

218. Ike Swetlitz, Should Companies Publicly Report Employees’ Weight and Stress
(Jan.
22,
2016),
Levels?,
STATNEWS
https://www.statnews.com/2016/01/22/publicizing-employee-health-data/.
219. Id.; Al Lewis, Vitality’s Glass House: Their Own Wellness Program Fails Their Own
SAID
WHAT?
(Jan.
2,
2016),
Employees,
THEY
https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/01/22/vitalitys-glass-house-their-own-wellnessprogram-fails-their-own-employees/.
220. See About the USPSTF, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE (Oct. 2016),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/about-the-uspstf.
221. See generally ALAN CASSELS, SEEKING SICKNESS: MEDICAL SCREENING
HUNT FOR DISEASE (2012).

AND THE

MISGUIDED

222. See e.g., id.; H. GILBERT WELCH ET AL., OVER-DIAGNOSED: MAKING PEOPLE SICK IN THE PURSUIT
OF HEALTH (2012); OTIS WEBB BRAWLEY, HOW WE DO HARM: A DOCTOR BREAKS RANKS ABOUT
BEING SICK (2012).
223. See, e.g., WELCH ET AL., supra note 222, at 45-60.
224. Id. at 80. (“[M]ammograms miss about one-quarter of cancers destined to appear
during the following year.”).

38

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
The Outcomes, Economics and Ethics of the Workplace Wellness Industry
3. the possibility of missing the most-aggressive and fastest-growing
tumors that grow between screening sessions but catching those
slow-growing or otherwise clinically insignificant tumors which may
not do harm; 225
4. failure to acknowledge that many cancers discovered during
screening are better left undetected because they will do no harm; 226
5. findings that are not the focus of the screens, called
incidentalomas, that are likely clinically insignificant; 227
6. the harms of screening itself, such as radiation, or physical harm,
as in colonoscopies. 228

Though not specifically confined to wellness, false-positive arithmetic
is also worth an example. Excluding people already diagnosed with
coronary-artery disease or who already know they are at high risk, maybe
one in one-thousand employees will suffer a heart attack this year. Assume
that there is a magical blood test that can determine who will suffer a heart
attack this year with ninety-percent accuracy. If an employee tests positive,
his odds of a false positive are not ten percent as would be expected if a
test is ninety-percent accurate. Instead, despite the test’s magical accuracy,
about one hundred out of one thousand employees will test positive, but
only one will have a heart attack. Meanwhile, the other ninety-nine
employees that tested positive will undergo unnecessary follow-up tests,
drugs, and procedures. 229 While patients could be expected not to
understand this, even doctors appear to vary greatly in their understanding
of false-positive arithmetic. 230
If doctors—following many years of college, medical school, and
supervised training—cannot understand these harms and this arithmetic, it
225. Id. (“There are two reasons why this happens: one is that the image (or the
radiologist looking at the image) fails to detect a cancer that is there: the other is
that the cancer wasn’t there at the time of the test but started growing soon after.
Unfortunately, the second explanation is a marker for a more deadly cancer,
because it indicates a fast-growing cancer.”).
226. Id. at 53 (“It used to be we thought all cancers progressed . . . but we are learning
this assumption is wrong.”).
227. Id. at 90.
228. Cheryl Clark, Colonoscopy Complications Occur at Surprisingly High Rate, MEDPAGE
TODAY
(Feb.
16,
2016)
http://www.medpagetoday.com/gastroenterology/generalgastroenterology/562
04.
229. Evan Horowitz, Why Don’t Screening Tests Seem to Help Against Cancer, BOSTON
GLOBE (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/02/26/oftenscreening-tests-don-help-against-cancer/gvaZGAE3yuMrcEOIzpg7IM/story.html.
230. Gerd Gigerenzer & Adrian Edwards, Simple Tools for Understanding Risk: From
Innumeracy to Insight, 327 BRITISH MED. J. 741, 741 (2003).
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seems unlikely that wellness vendors could do better, especially since the
industry lacks any requirements whatsoever for education, training, testing,
licensure, compliance, and ethics. Because of their failure to understand
basic false-positive arithmetic, vendors almost unanimously support annual
screening, believing that more prevention is better and that biometric
screening is the answer. 231 They also earn revenue for additional
screenings, 232 creating a moral hazard.
For example, Nebraska’s wellness-program sponsors waived all age
restrictions for preventive screenings 233 in order to encourage more
employees to get screenings. 234 They wrote that their screening coverage
was “greater than guidelines.” 235 The waiver reflects Nebraska’s—or its
vendor’s—failure to understand that USPSTF guidelines provide for the
optimal screening frequencies in order to balance harms and benefits,
rather than a minimum threshold. Age restrictions for screenings are
analogous to age restrictions for drivers; legislators have determined that
the hazards of allowing those younger than a certain age to drive exceed
the benefits. In both cases, waiving the age restrictions would be
counterproductive.
Nor is cost a factor in the USPSTF’s grades. The USPSTF charter does not
allow it to consider costs in grading. 236 A cost-benefit calculation, as
opposed to a harms-benefit calculation, would necessarily result in fewer
recommended tests unless screens were costless. Nebraska’s decision to
waive clinical guidelines is therefore irrational, even if it had been based on
the misconception that USPSTF guidelines are constrained by cost
considerations.
231. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 35.
232. The more people who get screened, and the more comprehensive the screen, the
higher the price. Few vendors put their pricing right on their websites. Group
Health Cooperative would be an example of one that does. Pricing for Biometric
HEALTH
(2013),
Screenings,
GROUP
https://producer.ghc.org/static/pdf/shared/forms/health-plan/populationhealth/Bio-pricing.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
233. Erika Fry, Corporate Wellness Programs: Healthy or Hokey?, FORTUNE (Mar. 15,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/15/corporate-health-wellness-programs/.
234. WELCOA, FIRST OF ITS KIND: THE STATE OF NEBRASKA’S INTEGRATED PLAN FOR HEALTH 7
(2012),
available
at
https://www.welcoa.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/case_study_nebraska.pdf (“[P]reventive coverage
within the Wellness Plan is greater than health care reform guidelines, in an effort
to encourage the use of preventive care.”).
235. Id. at 9.
236. The USPSTF grades are developed weighing harms and benefits. Costeffectiveness does not affect grades but is listed in “other considerations.” See
Update on Methods: How to Read the New Recommendations Statement, U.S.
PREVENTIVE
SERVS.
TASK
FORCE
(July
2007),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/update-onmethods-how-to-read-the-new-recommendation-statement.

40

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
The Outcomes, Economics and Ethics of the Workplace Wellness Industry

As part of waiving those guidelines, Nebraska mailed a reminder to get
colonoscopies seven times to twenty thousand employees. The reminder
featured a model far too young to need a colonoscopy. 237 Rather than admit
that it had made an error in over-screening the population, the vendor
boasted in a prominently displayed sidebar that these screenings had saved
the lives of 514 people who had “early stage” cancer. 238 It is not clinically
possible for this to have happened. Assuming that five thousand people
were screened, 239 one would expect to find only a couple of cases of cancer,
since only about 135,000 new cases are diagnosed annually in the entire
United States. 240 The vendor then admitted that it had lied about finding
514 cases. 241 In 2016, the state canceled the program after the vendor
admitted it had falsified data. 242 The Koop Committee then altered the
original application to replace the references to the 514 cases of cancer
with a reference to 514 generally harmless polyps. 243 Nebraska’s program
is not an outlier. Quite the contrary, it received a Koop Award in 2012 and
Goetzel referred to it as a “best practice” or “exemplar” on several separate
occasions. 244
Examples of inappropriate screening and screening frequencies
abound. 245 Companies that market USPSTF D-graded screens in order to
237. Al Lewis, Mr. Goetzel Covers Up his Cover-Up: The Latest on the Nebraska Koop
Award,
THEY
SAID
WHAT?
(Sept.
25,
2015),
https://theysaidwhat.net/2015/09/25/lies-damn-lies-and-the-nebraska-stateemployee-wellness-program/ (providing the no longer circulated Nebraska
colonoscopy flyer).
238. WELCOA, supra note 234, at 14 (“Life-saving, cost-saving catches . . . [of] 514 new
early-stage cases of cancer.”).
239. This assumption is based 5000 being roughly the number of Nebraska employees
who agreed to repeat blood draws, which are far simpler and less invasive than
colonoscopies.
240. Key Statistics for Colorectal Cancer: How Common is Colorectal Cancer?,
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/colon-rectal-cancer/about/keyCANCER.ORG,
statistics.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
241. Lewis, supra note 237 (providing the sidebar).
242. Id.
243. Al Lewis, Nebraska’s Award-Winning Wellness Program Meets an Ignominious
SAID
WHAT?
(Apr.
26,
2016),
Demise,
THEY
https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/04/26/nebraskas-award-winning-wellnessprogram-meets-an-ignominious-demise/.
244. See, e.g., Ron Goetzel et al., Do Workplace Health Promotion (Wellness) Programs
Work?, 56 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 931 (2014); Lewis, supra note 237
(quoting and providing screen shots of comments subsequently scrubbed from
Ron Goetzel’s article, Debunking the Myths About Workplace Wellness, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014)).
245. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 35; Al Lewis, The Great Debate, Part 8: Optum’s
Seth Serxner Jumps In, Throws Himself Under the Bus, THEY SAID WHAT? (Nov. 21,
2016), https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/11/21/the-great-debate-part-8-optumsseth-serxner-jumps-in-throws-himself-under-the-bus/ (Quoting Seth Serxner as
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increase revenue despite the documented likelihood of harms from those
screens include Star Wellness, AngioScreen, Total Wellness, HealthFair, and
Healthfairs USA. 246 Healthfairs USA not only advertises inappropriate
screenings with alleged ninety-nine percent accuracy rates, but also offers
to bill employees’ insurance company directly so that their employer
customers do not pay for them. 247
Connecticut’s wellness program requires mammograms for women
under thirty-nine years old, 248 while the USPSTF recommends that women
start receiving mammograms at age fifty. 249 The USPSTF very specifically
states that women should not have routine mammogram screens250 during
their forties. 251 It does not address whether women should have
mammograms during their thirties because there is no controversy around
whether women that young should routinely get them. It is nearly
universally acknowledged that they should not. 252 And yet Connecticut
requires them.
While many vendors do not market such clearly inappropriate tests,
most vendors knowingly market inappropriate screening frequencies for

saying, “[o]ur clients won’t let us screen [appropriately].”); HEALTH ENHANCEMENT
RESEARCH ORG., AM. COLL. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T MED. & CARE CONTINUUM ALLIANCE,
Biometric Health Screening for Employers, 55 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 1244,
1249 (2013) [hereinafter Biometric Screenings] (implying annual biometric
screenings, even while citing UPSTF guidelines (at 1247) that recommend annual
screenings only for blood pressure.).
246. Lewis & Khanna, supra note 107.
FAIRS
USA,
247. See
Cancer
Prevention
Screening,
HEALTH
http://www.healthfairsusa.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (to access their cancer
prevention screening section, click “cancer prevention screening,” which will lead
you to a screen called “your personalized health fair,” from there, click “cancer
prevention screening” once again). But see Al Lewis, HealthFairs USA: A Wellness
Program that Defies Description, THEY SAID WHAT? (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/10/06/healthfairs-usa-a-wellness-program-thatdefies-description/ (critiquing Health Fairs USA).
248. Becker, supra note 146.
249. Final Recommendation Statement: Breast Cancer: Screening, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS.
TASK
FORCE
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Document/Recommendat
ionStatementFinal/breast-cancer-screening1.
250. “Routine” and “screens” imply testing large populations with no indication for the
test. Some women, due to genetic predisposition or their own history, have
indications—and should get mammograms before age 50. However, those would
not be considered “screens.”
251. Id.
252. Id.; see also Sarah Khlein, Why Getting a Mammogram May Cause More Trouble
(Jan.
19,
2016),
Than
It’s
Worth,
PREVENTION
http://www.prevention.com/health/trouble-getting-mammogram-40 (providing
a lay explanation of the inadvisability of mammograms for women under 40).
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tests that every vendor offers. 253 For example, the USPSTF has
recommended that normal men and women begin receiving routine
cholesterol tests at age thirty-five and forty-five, respectively. 254 Most
vendors, however, advise their customers to test employees of all ages. 255
Only two vendors have attempted to explain their decision to ignore
USPSTF guidelines. 256 United Healthcare’s (“UHC”) Seth Serxner, who leads
the company’s wellness practice, stated that UHC flouts guidelines because
clients “won’t let us screen” appropriately. 257 However, UHC’s
spokesperson, Lauren Mihajlov, was unable to provide an example in which
a client had prevented UHC from screening appropriately, even after she
insisted that such clients existed. 258 Further, it appears that, according to
Optum’s own marketing materials, paying for Optum’s annual—and
therefore inappropriate—screenings is required as part of purchasing their
group health insurance. 259
Whereas UHC offered an excuse for ignoring guidelines, Healthmine
publicly proposed a justification for its screening-maximization model; it
explained that the United States “Preventative” [sic] Services Task Force is
wrong, and that the more people get screened, the more likely they are to
become healthier. 260 They offer neither a scientific rationale for this claim
nor any deconstruction of the USPSTF’s methodology. 261
253. Only three vendors, It Starts with Me, Sterling Wellness, and Quizzify, are on the
record as recommending against annual screens of all employees. See generally
INST.,
Validated
Organizations,
VALIDATION
http://www.validationinstitute.com/validated-organizations/#it-starts-with-mehealth (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). Yet the USPSTF lists only one screen, blood
pressure, as appropriate to do on an annual basis to all adults. USPSTF A and B
Recommendations, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE (June 2016),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/uspstf-a-and-brecommendations/.
254. Lipid Disorders in Adults, supra note 32.
255. While it is possible that vendors other than the three mentioned above
recommend against annual screens for all employees (plus the unverified claim by
Optum’s Seth Serxner that Optum opposes them), the author has been able to
identify no other vendor which claims to screen according to guidelines instead of
annually.
256. See, The Great Debate, Part 8, supra note 245; Williams, supra note 35.
257. Audio recording: Population Health Alliance 16th Annual Leadership Forum (Nov.
2 2015), available at https://ccavoice.wordpress.com/2016/10/12/the-greatdebate/ (click “here” on “Download the recording here”); see also The Great
Debate, Part 8, supra note 245 (providing excerpts and explanations).
258. Correspondences between Lauren Mihajlov, United Healthcare, and Al Lewis,
January 5, 2016 (on file with author).
259. Al Lewis, Is Optum Alternative-Facting?, THEY SAID WHAT? (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://theysaidwhat.net/2017/02/22/is-optum-alternative-facting/.
260. Williams, supra note 35.
261. Id.
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Wellness programs also routinely require employees to get annual
checkups. Even if annual checkups were costless, it is well-established that
checkups are more likely to harm than benefit employees. 262 Choosing
Wisely, a joint project of the American Board of Internal Medicine
Foundation and Consumer Reports, also recommends against them for the
same reason. 263 Despite these recommendations, wellness vendors and
wellness programs routinely include checkups. 264 One vendor, Passport
Health, recommends that annual physicals be expanded to include two
checkup staples from the 1950s to 1980s—complete blood counts and
chest x-rays 265—despite the overwhelming evidence that those two tests
are more likely to create harms than benefits as part of a checkup. 266
Passport Health’s website also states:
Fortunately, the detrimental side effects and mounting costs of many
diseases can be avoided altogether. What is the best way to avoid
disease? The answer is simple: early detection. Indeed, employee
wellness programs that include physical exams and biometric testing
can detect diseases in their earliest and most treatable stages,
significantly reducing employer medical expenses and, of course, also
potentially saving employees’ lives. 267

Bravo Wellness’s president was quoted as part of a USA Today/Kaiser
Health News article questioning the benefits of workplace wellness as

262. Ateev Mehrotra & Allan Prochazka, Improving Value in Health Care—Against the
Annual Physical, 373 N. ENG. J. MED. 1485, 1487 (Oct. 2015).
263. CONSUMER REPORTS, Health Checkups: When you Need Them—and When You Don’t,
CHOOSING WISELY (Mar. 2014), http://www.choosingwisely.org/patientresources/health-checkups/.
264. See e.g., David Rook, Effective Wellness Programs Focus on Screenings and
Immunizations Over Behavior Modification, JP GRIFFIN GROUP (July 9, 2015),
https://www.griffinbenefits.com/employeebenefitsblog/effective-wellnessprograms-screenings-immunizations (providing an example of a program that
simply assumes the employees will get a routine annual checkup); Routine Annual
Physical (500 points) and/or Biometric Screening (125 points), BP,
http://hr.bpglobal.com/LifeBenefits/Shared/Pages/BP-Life-benefits/BPWellness-Programs/Routine-Annual-Physical----500-Points.aspx (last visited Apr.
1, 2017) (offering incentives for annual checkups).
HEALTH
USA,
265. Employee
Physical
Examinations,
PASSPORT
https://cdn.passporthealthusa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ROI-PhysicalExam.pdf?127b2a (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
266. Id.; Harriet Hall, Re-thinking the Annual Physical, SCIENCE-BASED MEDICINE (Feb. 21,
2012), https://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/re-thinking-the-annual-physical/.
267. See Employee Physical Examinations, supra note 265.
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saying that annual physicals could lead to fewer cancers, 268 a claim with no
support in academic literature. 269
Wellness programs also encourage unhealthy dieting behaviors by
rewarding employees for participating in crash-dieting contests. There is no
evidence that corporations can help employees maintain weight loss in the
long term. 270 No program reported in the academic literature has ever
tracked employee weight for a period exceeding a year, including dropouts,
and showed sustained weight loss. 271 The single study lasting a year (“Penn
Study”) was also the most rigorous in terms of study design. 272 The study
showed that a variety of incentives and penalties aimed at promoting
weight loss had virtually no impact. 273 Further, once the incentives and
penalties were removed, employees regained the weight. 274 Even Goetzel
admits that biggest-loser contests “aren’t actually effective, and can be
quite harmful when people try to lose weight too quickly.” 275
As was the case with the Connecticut study, which was also performed
by investigators connected to the wellness industry, the Penn Study’s
investigators also came to a conclusion that was much more optimistic than
the data; 276 the data appeared to support a conclusion that incentives and
penalties do not work to cure obesity any more than they work to cure
other diseases. 277 Instead of concluding that incentives simply do not work
since five combinations or permutations of incentives and penalties failed,
Dr. Patel concluded that
the incentives may have failed for a number of reasons. The $550
premium discount may not have been large enough. Bundling the
financial reward into the insurance premium on a paycheck rather
268. Julie Appleby, Benefits of Workplace Wellness Programs Questioned, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/10/03/kaiserworkplace-wellness-programs-overtesting/73109946/.
269. See High Impact Journals, Superfund Research Program, NAT’L INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH
SCI., https://tools.niehs.nih.gov/srp/publications/highimpactjournals.cfm
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2017) (listing “high-impact literature,” which includes New England
Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Association, and Health
Affairs, between 2009 and July 2016).
270. Alfred Lewis, Vikram Khanna & Shana Montrose, Employers Should Disband
Employee Weight Control Programs, 21 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE e91, e92-93 (2015).
271. See generally High Impact Journals, supra note 269.
272. Mitesh S. Patel, et al., Premium-Based Financial Incentives Did Not Promote
Workplace Weight Loss in a 2013-15 Study, 35 HEALTH AFF. 71, 71 (2016).
273. Id. at 76.
274. Id.
275. Greg Kunkel, Conversation with Dr. Ron Goetzel: A Culture of Well-Being (Feb. 19,
2016), https://perksatwork.nextjump.com/2016/02/19/culture-of-health/.
276. Patel et al., supra note 272, at 77.
277. Id. at 71.
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than making a separate payment to the worker may have affected
how it was perceived. Other details—such as the fact that
participants weighed themselves at work rather than at home—may
have been off-putting to some participants. 278

He did not conclude that the wide variety of incentives and penalties tested
failed because it is not possible to pay people to lose weight or fine them if
they do not. That conclusion would have been supported by the five
examples of incentives and penalties in the study. 279 He also never
addressed why a company would offer a $550 incentive to its employees to
encourage them to lose weight when most evidence finds no link between
weight and healthcare spending or productivity. 280 A 2017 study published
in the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine supports that
finding as well, showing that incentives have no effect on health outcomes.
Researchers associated with a very highly regarded wellness vendor
conducted this study, and thus would not have been tainted by investigator
bias. 281
Due to the political difficulty of creating RCTs in a corporate setting,
only one employer has ever conducted and published an RCT on diet. 282
Both groups consisted of diabetic or overweight employees. 283 The study
group did not lose more weight than the control group, 284 and members of
the study group increased their consumption of carbohydrates relative to
the control group while reducing their consumption of fat. 285 The authors
concluded that this was a successful outcome, 286 though carbohydrate
consumption is widely believed to be a factor hastening the development
and progression of diabetes. 287
While whether increased carbohydrate consumption is harmful is
controversial, whether employer-sponsored crash-dieting programs are
harmful is not. These programs, also known as biggest-loser contests or
278. Id. at 76.
279. As this article was going to press, another study came to the same conclusion—
that incentives did not generate weight loss or other behavior change. Nathan A.
Barleen et al., Outcome-based and Participation-based Wellness Incentives, 59 J.
OCCUP. ENVTL. MED. 304 (2017).
280. Lewis et al, supra note 270, at e91-e94.
281. Barleen et al., supra note 279.
282. See S. Mishra et. al, Nutrient Intake in the GEICO Multicenter Trial: The Effects of
a Multicomponent Worksite Intervention, 67 EUR. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1066 (2013).
283. Id. at 1067.
284. Id. at 1068.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1070.
287. See Jeff S. Volek & Richard D. Feinman, Carbohydrate Restriction Improves the
Features of Metabolic Syndrome. Metabolic Syndrome May be Defined by the
Response to Carbohydrate Restriction, 2 NUTRITION & METABOLISM 1, 4 (2005).
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weight-loss challenges, may actually be harmful for two reasons: first, the
monetary reward creates an incentive to binge before the first weigh-in and
then fast before the last, and second, repeated involvement in these
contests causes weight cycling, which has a negative impact on health. 288
One website suggests that employees cheat in these contests, teaching
them to gain as much weight as possible as quickly as possible so that by
the initial weigh-in, the employee is “a big bloated sloshing mess that needs
to go to the bathroom really bad.” 289 Further, a recent study published in
the New England Journal of Medicine finds that, while bad for everyone,
weight-cycling is especially risky for people with diagnosed or undiagnosed
heart disease. Ironically, this is exactly the cohort whose future heart events
and claims costs should be most concerning to employers. 290 Absent any
refutation of these apparently significant harms from crash-dieting
contests, it is difficult to imagine a good reason to undertake them.
Wellness is unusual in healthcare because its evidentiary basis is so
non-existent that critics need not develop their own databases and engage
in a debate about whose facts are right. Instead, as has been shown
multiple times in this article, it is usually possible to show that the industry’s
own data, taken at face value, shows the opposite of what it intends to
show. Or, as stated in lay terms in Surviving Workplace Wellness: “In
wellness, you don’t have to challenge the data to invalidate it. You merely
have to read the data. It will invalidate itself.” 291
Nowhere is this more evident than in the Wellsteps program conducted
on behalf of the Boise School District, which won a Koop Award.292 The
harms are laid out both objectively and subjectively in Wellsteps’
application. Objectively, it lists changes in employees’ weight, glucose,
cholesterol, and blood pressure, stating that there were 5293 year-overyear improvements and 6397 deteriorations in health status. Thus, the
organization’s health, objectively speaking, deteriorated. A deterioration in
employees’ health of this magnitude cannot be explained by aging for many
reasons, the most important of which is that the data was adjusted for age
288. See Weight Cycling . . . Facts About “Yo-Yo” Dieting, MEDICINENET (last updated Aug.
27, 2003), http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=21745;
see also Heather Sayles Lehman, Why ‘The Biggest Loser’ At Work Doesn’t Work,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 12, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-thebiggest-loser-at-work-doesnt-work_us_577c37f5e4b0ad1e7bff6504.
289. Biggest Loser Competition? Here is How to Win!!, HEALTH STATUS,
https://www.healthstatus.com/health_blog/body-fat-calculator-2/biggest-losercompetition-win/.
290. NYU LANGONE MED. CTR., Body Weight Fluctuations Linked to More Deaths in People
(Apr.
4,
2017),
with
Coronary
Artery
Disease,
NEWSWISE
http://www.newswise.com/articles/body-weight-fluctuations-linked-to-moredeaths-in-people-with-coronary-artery-disease.
291. AL LEWIS & VIK KHANNA, SURVIVING WORKPLACE WELLNESS WITH YOUR DIGNITY, FINANCES AND
(MAJOR) ORGANS INTACT 24 (2014).
292. Aldana, supra note 165.
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and sex. Confirming the net risk-factor deterioration was the subjective
answer to the single most important question in a health interview
designed to rate employee health: 293 “How would you rate your health?”
The average answer declined from 7.96 to 7.92 over two years. 294
It is therefore possible to conclude that—at least in one, carefully
measured, award-winning program described as the best program of
2016—wellness programs harmed employees. But both harms were
obscured; the columns listing improvements and deteriorations were not
totaled in the award application, nor did anyone on the Koop Committee
total them, 295 even though an article in which the Committee members
were quoted had already questioned the total. 296 Further, the employees’
perception that their health had deteriorated was described as an
“improvement” in the preceding paragraph and was ignored when the Koop
was bestowed upon Wellsteps for this performance. 297
D.

The Ethics of Wellness: Deliberate or Negligent Data Falsification

The self-described wellness-industry leaders, including the members
and sponsors of HERO and the Health Project, regularly produce data that
is demonstrably false. 298 Consider McKesson, the 2015 award winner.
McKesson achieved a one-percent risk reduction, which generated a sevenpercent cost reduction. If every one-percent reduction in risk truly did
generate seven percent in cost savings, then a fifteen-percent reduction in
risk factors for heart disease and diabetes would theoretically be more than
enough to wipe out all spending on everything.
The Nebraska example was similar. While the application did not
disclose exactly how much money the 5199 screened employees spent
based on yearly employer-paid healthcare spending for a single employee,
293. See, e.g., A. Bowling, Just One Question: If One Question Works, Why Ask Several?,
59 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 342 (2005).
294. Aldana, supra note 165.
PROJECT,
295. See
Boise
School
District:
Critique,
HEALTH
http://thehealthproject.com/winner/boise-school-district/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2017).
296. See Begley, supra note 10 (providing the above quotes); How the 2016 Koop
Award Raises Lying to an Art Form, supra note 158 (providing a critique of that
article and the Koop Committee’s reaction to it).
297. Aldana, supra note 165.
298. Begley, supra note 10 (addressing the 2015 and 2016 Koop award winners);
Shutan, supra note 107 (addressing 2015’s Koop Award controversy); Martha
Stoddard, Nebraska’s Acclaimed Wellness Program Coming under Fire, OMAHA
WORLD
HERALD
(July
15,
2013),
http://www.omaha.com/livewellnebraska/nebraska-s-acclaimed-wellnessprogram-under-fire/article_ccf3e8d8-4348-54e6-bb83-cca843dcd9a7.html
(addressing the controversy surrounding the 2012 winner). TheySaidWhat?.com
invalidates most award-winners since 2010. Enter the name of the winner into the
“search” box.
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one can assume that the employees spent about five thousand dollars each,
299
or about twenty-six million dollars in total. About three percent of them
fell to low-risk status. Though so few employees fell to low-risk status,
Nebraska alleged it saved $4.2 million. 300 If every three-percent reduction
in risk truly did save $4.2 million, then an eighteen-percent reduction in risk
factors for heart disease and diabetes would theoretically be almost
enough to wipe out all spending on everything.
The most dramatic example is the 2016 award winner, Wellsteps,
whose CEO was a Koop committee member until shortly before the award
was announced. 301 Employee risk factors actually increased, but costs
allegedly fell by roughly one-third, more than in any other program. The
Health Project did not address this apparent invalidity when bestowing the
Koop on Wellsteps, though the deterioration in health indicators is easily
tallied or observed from the figures in the award applications. 302 Further,
when asked about how an award for employee health improvement could
go to an applicant admitting that employee health deteriorated, Goetzel
explained that the committee “would look askance at an application which
said everything went exactly right.” 303
There were also two instances where applications for Koop Awards
were falsified retroactively. 304 One was the 2011 Eastman Chemical/Health
Fitness Corporation award discussed above, in which the x-axis labels were
eliminated once an exposé was published. 305 The other was for the 2012
Nebraska award, whose outcomes report originally included claims of

299. Christina Merhar, FAQ – How Much Does it Cost to Provide Health Insurance to
Employees (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.zanebenefits.com/blog/faq-how-muchdoes-it-cost-to-provide-health-insurance-to-employees.
300. Stoddard, supra note 298.
301. Steven Aldana, Workplace Wellness Beats the S&P Again and Again and . . . ,
LINKEDIN (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/workplace-wellnessbeats-sp-again-dr-steven-aldana.
302. See Aldana, supra note 165 (Tallying the total improvements and the total
deteriorations revealed in Table 4 shows that 5293 indicators improved while
6297 deteriorated. Observing the decline in Table 2 from 7.96 to 7.92 in self-rated
health is the subjectively reported counterpart to the objectively reported
biometrics.); see also Begley, supra note 10; Albert Einstein Meets Koop, supra
note 208.
303. Begley, supra note 10.
304. These awards are shown, together with recently added their “Erratum”
statements that acknowledge the correctness of our work. See generally C. Everett
Koop National Health Awards, HEALTH PROJECT, www.thehealthproject.com (last
visited Apr. 1, 2017).
305. Frakt, supra note 102 (discussing the x-axis and the “failure” of the original
analysis); see also Al Lewis, Koop Award Committee Meets Sergeant Schultz, THEY
SAID WHAT? (Sept. 8, 2015), https://theysaidwhat.net/2015/09/08/koop-awardcommittee-meets-sergeant-schultz/.
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“cost-saving, life-saving catches” on 514 state employees alleged to have
colon cancer. 306

Figure 8. The original heading and the original claim that Nebraska’s wellness program
and its vendor, Health Fitness Corporation, made in reference to cancer victims.

As described earlier, it is not possible to catch 514 cases of colon cancer
by screening several thousand people; in the United States, only about one
in 3000 people are diagnosed with it annually. 307 Screening several
thousand people should have yielded only a very small number of cases; to
catch 514 cases, they would have had to screen more than 1.5 million
people. Statistically, it should have been quite apparent to the Koop
evaluators that the claim was falsified. This was especially true after Health
Fitness Corporation’s Chief Medical Director and Wellness Officer admitted
that the claim was falsified. 308 When confronted with the impossibility of
the claim that Nebraska caught 514 new cases of colon cancer in 2012, the
Chief Medical Director described the difference between having cancer and
not having cancer as “semantics.” 309
306. Though the actual type of cancer is not mentioned in the screenshot, the cancers
were mostly colon cancer, as disclosed by the medical director of the project,
Dennis Richling, in Stoddard, supra note 298, and now stated in the application,
screenshotted below, as “mostly colon.”; The screenshot below is drawn from the
original outcomes report, which is available from the author, but which has been
removed from the Health Fitness Corporation website; the colon cancer flyer is
available in Al Lewis, The Latest on Nebraska: Ron Goetzel Covers up his Cover up,
THEY SAID WHAT? (Sept. 21, 2016), https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/09/21/thelatest-on-nebraska-ron-goetzel-covers-up-his-cover-up/.
CANCER
SOC’Y,
307. Colorectal
Cancer
Facts
and
Figures,
AM.
https://www.cancer.org/research/cancer-facts-statistics/colorectal-cancer-factsfigures.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
308. Stoddard, supra note 298.
309. Id.
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The wording elsewhere on Nebraska’s original award application was
changed accordingly on November 2, 2015, after a noted health economist
and journalist inquired about the impossibility of the award-winning
finding. 310 In 2012, prior to the journalist’s inquiry, the award application
indicated that “during the two year period, 514 new cases were detected
with an early stage of cancer . . . unfortunately, 26 new cases were
diagnosed with a late stage of cancer.” 311 After the journalist’s inquiry, the
application was revised to state that “during the two year period, 514
benign colorectal polyps and precancerous lesions of the cervix were
detected and 26 new cases were diagnosed.” 312 The original statement in
question appeared in a formal 2012 letter from the Nebraska governor’s
office as part of the original application. 313
While negligence and general innumeracy cannot be ruled out in some
cases, deliberate falsification is widespread. 314 One example is Wellsteps’
ROI Calculator, an allegedly interactive model designed to demonstrate the
financial benefit of wellness programs. The model allows users to enter a
range of assumptions for possible annual healthcare spending and
percentages of employees who smoke or are obese, both before and after
the program. 315 The model, however, is fabricated. If the cell labeled
“Annual % Cost Increase” is set to zero, as an economist would recommend
in order to avoid confounding the results with inflation, the model
invariably yields a savings of $1359 per employee in the final year of the
calculation, no matter what variables the user enters for obesity and
smoking, as the two following screenshots illustrate. In the first example,
the program was perfect, wiping out obesity and smoking in a workforce in
which nearly every employee was an obese smoker.

310. Linda Riddell, of www.healtheconomy.net, interviewed Mr. Goetzel but did not
publish the interview.
311. See Al Lewis, Cancergate: Did a Koop Award Committee Member Commit a Crime?,
SAID
WHAT?
(Mar.
29,
2016),
THEY
https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/03/29/cancergate-did-a-koop-award-committeemember-commit-a-crime/.
312. Id.
313. See State of Nebraska, HEALTH PROJECT, http://thehealthproject.com/winner/stateof-nebraska-wellnessoptions/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
314. Visit
ROI
Calculator,
WELLSTEPS,
https://www.wellsteps.com/roi/resources_tools_roi_cal_health.php (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017), which will be the first example. Enter “0” for “Annual % Cost
Increase.” Then enter whatever variables you like in the other 6 boxes. Then hit:
“Calculate” and “Impact of Wellness Programs.” As of this writing and for the
previous 5 years, the “savings” column will max out at $1358.50/employee
regardless of changes in obesity or smoking over the course of the program.
315. See Id.
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Figure 9. Wellsteps ROI model when highly favorable information is entered. 316

In the next example, the workforce was perfectly healthy to begin with,
so no improvement was possible, but the savings are still $1359.

Figure 10. Wellsteps ROI model when there is no improvement possible.317
316. Id.
317. Visit Id. Enter “0” for “Annual % Cost Increase.” Then enter whatever variables you
like in the other 6 boxes. Then hit: “Calculate” and “Impact of Wellness Programs.”
As of this writing and for the previous 5 years, the “savings” column will max out
at $1358.50/employee.
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In other words, the answer is always the same, regardless of the other
variables entered, once inflation is eliminated.
Wellsteps’ reaction to this author’s initial exposé on this topic was to
prevent modelers from entering increases in smoking and obesity rates or
low annual rates of spending. 318 Prior to the exposé, even dramatic
deteriorations in workforce health generated $1359 in savings. 319 Annual
spending figures below $1359 per employee created negative spending in
the final year. 320 Of course, negative spending is mathematically impossible;
it would require the health plan to pay the employer a monthly premium.
The model’s underlying algorithm, which has shown $1359 per
employee in savings in the last year since its inception, remained
unchanged. 321 Wellsteps’ public reaction to this exposé was to send out a
mass email to health-insurance brokers stating that the model was based
on “every wellness ROI study ever published.” 322 This email was sent to a
broad distribution list; multiple people forwarded this email to this author.
The email alleged that “11,000 brokers and consultants have used”
Wellsteps’ ROI calculator to “estimate the impact of wellness on health care
costs . . . produce client-specific reports that show wellness impact, [and]
help [their] clients implement effective wellness programs.” 323
Wellsteps is a particularly compelling example for two reasons. First, it
demonstrates wellness vendors’ perception that human-resources
executives and consultants are so innumerate that they will believe what
they are told or accept invented figures because eleven thousand other
people are alleged to have accepted them, rather than enter data into the
model to test the self-evident proposition that the model is fabricated.
Second, this example demonstrates the failure of self-regulation in this
field. Rather than be sanctioned, as Wellsteps would be if it presented this
model to the general public and were subject to consumer protection
regulations, Wellsteps’ CEO maintained his seat on the Health Project until
he resigned before the Health Project bestowed its 2016 award on his
company to avoid the obvious conflict of interest. As a member of The
318. See Id. (showing it is no longer possible to enter increases in smoking or obesity,
or annual spending below $2000/person.).
319. Al Lewis & Vik Khanna, Why Are Al Lewis and Vik Khanna Such Jerks?, HEALTH CARE
BLOG (Apr. 24, 2014), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2014/04/24/why-areal-lewis-and-vik-khanna-such-jerks/.
320. Id.
321. Entering any set of assumptions into the model generates $1359/employee in
savings in the final year, provided that “0%” is entered into “annual % cost
increase.” ROI Calculator, supra note 314.
322. Al Lewis, Wellsteps ROI Calculator Doesn’t Calculate ROI . . . and That’s the Good
SAID
WHAT?
(July
23,
2014),
News,”
THEY
https://theysaidwhat.net/2014/07/23/wellsteps001/.
323. Id.
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Health Project, he helped bestow the Koop on many other programs whose
outcomes were invalid.
As discussed earlier, Interactive Health’s consulting firm, Zoe
Consulting, originally wrote a report misattributing massive savings to trivial
risk reduction. A subsequent version of report from which that instructive
example was extracted, currently available on the Interactive Health
website, now omits the table and does not include any acknowledgement
of the one-percent favorable risk migration or an explanation for how such
a trivial risk reduction could support the eight-figure savings claims. Zoe
Consulting also claims in this revised report to be a “two-time C. Everett
Koop award-winner for outcomes achieved in maternity and disease
management,” which is also false. 324
Optum’s claim that the company wants to screen appropriately but
“clients won’t let [them]” is belied by marketing materials that say
“participation in our wellness program is a Savings4Health requirement,” 325
and Savings4Health does require annual biometric screens. 326 The
marketing materials also continue to cite the Harvard Study as justification
for the ROI from wellness, along with an ROI claim attributed to WELCOA
that WELCOA’s Executive Director says neither he nor anyone now at
WELCOA made or, to his knowledge, believes. 327

V.

The Employee Health and Wellness Program Code of Conduct

Lest the reader reach the conclusion that all wellness vendors and
consultants are dishonest or incompetent, there are certainly exceptions.
The program at Cummins—which itself is recognized as a “best place to
work” 328—recently received a very favorable profile in Fortune. 329 The
author himself participates in an exemplary program at his wife’s
workplace, Boston College. Screening is done every three years—roughly
corresponding to USPSTF guideline—and measures USPSTF A- and B-rated
biometric values only. The advice offered on the health risk assessment and
by the wellness coaches—who are employees of Harvard Pilgrim Health
324. INTERACTIVE HEALTH & ZOE CONSULTING, INC., supra note 198, at 9; Winners Listed
PROJECT,
http://thehealthproject.com/winningAlphabetically,
HEALTH
programs/winners-listed-alphabetically/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (providing a list
of Koop award winners).
325. Lewis, supra note 259.
326. Missouri Health and Wellness Programs and Guidelines for Each, UNITED HEALTHCARE
(May
2014),
http://broker.uhc.com/assets/UHCEW696595_wellness.grid.6_17.pdf.
327. Lewis, supra note 259.
FORBES,
328. The
25
Best
Places
to
Work,
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/elhm45eeke/no-20-cummins/#d4ad6cc25f1a
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
329. Fry, supra note 233.
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Care, which itself is consistently rated among the country’s best health
plans 330—is also up to date and in accordance with best practices.
Further, one wellness vendor, U.S. Preventive Medicine (“USPM”), is
among the thirty-nine employee-health-services vendors to achieve
validation of its outcomes through the Care Innovations Validation
Institute. 331 USPM was able to reduce WSMAs by a substantial percentage,
as indicated in the writeup. 332
It may also be possible to offer a wellness program that neither forces
employees to participate nor incentivizes employees to take short-term
steps that may harm long-term health, while focusing employees on longterm health and rewarding them for staying healthy. 333 However, this
approach is at total variance with the industry’s focus on near term results.
The Ethical Wellness website 334 offers a voluntary Employee Health and
Wellness Program Code of Conduct. It captures best practices, in
contradistinction from most of this article. Vendors, consultants, wellness
practitioners, and employers may endorse this Code 335 if they believe they
can adhere to the standards of, for example, not harming employees and
not lying about outcomes. 336 Employers do not endorse the Code of
Conduct lightly, because if they were to endorse and then violate the Code,
it could create a cause of action as a material misrepresentation.
The rapidly increasing number of vendors and consultants who are
endorsing this code—as of this writing, none of which are also portrayed in
this essay—does indicate that much of the industry agrees with this article’s
findings that the behaviors and actions of leading figures and award
committees in this field are unacceptable, and that ethics and competence
should be recognized and rewarded.
330. HARV. PILGRIM HEALTHCARE, HARVARD PILGRIM HEALTH CARE RATED AMONG THE NATION’S
HIGHEST-RATED
HEALTH
PLANS
BY
NCQA
(2016),
available
at
https://www.harvardpilgrim.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/MEMBERS/ABOUT/NEW
S/NEWSROOMPDF/PR-NCQA-2016.PDF.
INST.,
331. Product
and
Service
Vendors,
VALIDATION
https://www.validationinstitute.com/validated-organizations/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2017) (Disclosure: the author’s company, Quizzify, the leading employee healthliteracy vendor, also has validation from the Validation Institute.)
INST.,
332. About
this
Validation:
USPM,
VALIDATION
https://www.validationinstitute.com/validated-organizations/#uspm (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017).
333. Al Lewis, A Wellness Program Everyone Can Love, INS. THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (Apr. 11,
2017), http://insurancethoughtleadership.com/a-wellness-program-everyonecan-love/.
334. www.ethicalwellness.org
335. An example of a Fortune 500 employer that endorses the Code would be
Cummins. Cummins was also profiled for its innovative approach to wellness in
Fortune, and is named by Fortune as a “best company to work for.” See Fry, supra
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A voluntary code of conduct is no substitute for oversight, and the
wellness industry completely lacks vendor-specific regulations, licensing
and educational requirements, and other forms of oversight. 337 This lack of
regulation allows one major vendor, Star Wellness, to sell franchises, with
requirements for franchisees that are not found in other, regulated,
healthcare endeavors.
Star specifically states that “you do not need a medical background” to
sell franchises. 338 Instead, it assures applicants that a background in sales is
sufficient, and lists municipality administration as an alternative
qualification. 339 The major requirement is a $67,000 franchise fee. 340 Once
a franchisee has paid, he receives up to five days of classroom training. 341
Then, he is a wellness vendor, and can give employees advice with no
restrictions and no recourse if the advice is incorrect.
The very existence of this unregulated franchise opportunity illustrates
why wellness providers should be regulated. Indeed, there are three
independent reasons why they should be subject not just to any
regulations, but rather to stricter regulations than other healthcare
providers. First, possible harms to employees alone would be a sufficient
reason for basic oversight. Second, the involuntary nature of wellness
prevents employees from making a free-market response to these harms.
Employees cannot just ignore these vendors. Other healthcare costs people
money if they opt in. Wellness costs people money if they opt out.
Finally, paternalistic programs necessitate the highest evidence-based
standards of all. Very few healthcare-related interventions are de facto
required. Those that are, such as seat belts and childhood vaccines, have
cost-benefit ratios so high that, with rare exception, no one even studies
them anymore. For instance, vaccines have wiped out smallpox and polio in
the United States at a cost of only a few dollars per dose to maintain
immunity against the slight chance the virus will be introduced again. 342

337. A list of existing laws and regulations may be found at Biometric Screenings, supra
note 245. The laws and regulations pertain exclusively to the drawing and analysis
of blood. They do not cover the clinical validity of the advice or the advisability or
USPSTF ratings of the screened biometric values.
338. Medical Services Franchise Questions – Star Wellness, STAR WELLNESS USA,
http://starwellnessusa.com/franchiseopportunity/franchisefaqs/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. David Williams, Cost, Need Questioned in $433-Million Smallpox Drug Deal, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/13/nation/la-nasmallpox-20111113 (noting Smallpox vaccines only cost $3 per dose); E. C. Pune,
(July
19,
2013),
Injecting
Competition,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/blogs/feastandfamine/2013/07/polio-vaccines
(noting Polio vaccines cost $5 per dose).
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Seat belt cost-benefit ratios exceed 100 to 1. 343 Wellness is the only de facto
required healthcare intervention that has a negative benefit-cost ratio,
according to the industry’s own data. Even the wellness industry’s leading
proponent, Ron Goetzel, claims that a one-to-one ROI is acceptable “only if
you can improve the health . . . of your workers.” 344 This article has shown,
however, many instances of likely or actual negative impacts on health—
too-frequent screening, inappropriate screening, crash-dieting contests,
carefully measured deterioration in employee health caused by the 2016
best wellness company, and a complete lack of impact on health outcomes
on a nationwide level—that would cause one to question the entire premise
that financially coercing employees into corporate wellness programs is
good for employers, society, or employees.
Despite the potential for harms arising from ignoring USPSTF
guidelines, it is unlikely that Congress would pass a law prohibiting harmful
screening practices, given the BRT and the United States Chamber of
Commerce’s influence. Their priority is preserving employers’ ability to tie
thirty to fifty percent of employee healthcare premiums to employee
behavior. It is unlikely they would support any constraints on workplace
wellness, even to preserve employee health, if such constraints would
impede employer discretion over the deployment of screening and other
wellness programs. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce
recently approved exactly that, on a party-line twenty-two to seventeen
vote. The Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act would allow
employers to genetically screen both employees and their families as part
of wellness programs and would increase the cap on penalties by applying
it to the entire family premium instead of just the employee-specific
premium. 345 Were this bill to be enacted, it would free wellness programs
from the constraints imposed on employers by the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondisclosure Act, while
making non-participation more financially onerous for employees. 346
Therefore, this article advocates only a politically feasible regulation
that would require employers to disclose the likelihood of harms from
crash-dieting contests, annual checkups, and screens not carrying a USPSTF
grade of A or B, and to give employees the option to undertake a different,
harmless wellness activity to avoid forfeiture. Under this regulation, absent
343. Lives Saved in 2015 by Restraint Use and Minimum-Drinking-Age Laws, U.S. DEP’T
OF
TRANSP.
(Aug.
2016),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812319
(noting
roughly 14,000 lives per year are saved by seatbelts).
344. Kunkel, supra note 275.
345. Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th Cong. (2017-2018).
346. Reed Abelson, How Healthy Are You? G.O.P. Bill Would Help Employers Find Out,
TIMES
(Mar.
10,
2017),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/health/workplace-wellness-programshealth-genetic-data.html.
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the provision of an alternative, safer activity available to employees,
employers would not be allowed to impose any financial forfeiture.
As one example of a way to promulgate that regulation, consider the
Employee Health and Wellness Program Code of Conduct (“Code”). 347
WELCOA, the largest wellness trade association, has enthusiastically
endorsed it as a founder. It therefore must be acceptable to a large swath
of its vendor members. Other leading vendors, including Limeade, Redbrick,
Sterling, Sonic Boom, and It Starts with Me, have endorsed it directly.
Conversely, the Code has met with strong resistance from some vendors
this article profiles—vendors who, by definition, would be in violation of the
Code anyway. 348 Wellsteps, for instance, referred to the originators of the
Code—including this author—as “a gang of bullies.” 349 Perhaps a workable
compromise would be that vendors could be required to either adopt the
Code or disclose why they have elected not to adopt the Code, with
consequences as described in the previous paragraph.
Further, vendors themselves should be subject to oversight and
licensure. There should be a professional education requirement to ensure
that providers understand the screens, contests, and other activities they
are performing or administering. A background in sales or municipal
administration, plus five days of classroom training and three days of onthe-job supervision, should not be sufficient to receive a license to perform
involuntary medical tests on employees.
These proposed regulations would give employees the opportunity to
avoid being harmed by a wellness vendor. In this industry, absence of harm
to employees would be a noticeable improvement over the current state of
affairs.

347. Code of Conduct, supra note 11.
348. See Al Lewis, Optum, HERO Lead Backlash Against Code of Conduct, THEY SAID
WHAT? (Sept. 7, 2016), https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/09/07/optum-hero-leadbacklash-against-employee-health-code-of-conduct/.
349. Al Lewis, Wellsteps: We Don’t Need Your Stinkin’ Code of Conduct, THEY SAID WHAT?
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://theysaidwhat.net/2016/11/29/wellsteps-we-dont-needyour-stinkin-code-of-conduct/.

58

